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Raymond Scott Peck vs. Idaho Transportation Department
Date

Code

User

1/14/2010

NCOC

HENDRICKSO

New Case Filed - Other Claims

Steve Verby

APER

HENDRICKSO

Plaintiff: Peck, Raymond Scott Appearance John
A Finney

Steve Verby

HENDRICKSO

Filing: L3 - Appeal or petition for judicial review or Steve Verby
cross appeal or cross-petition from commission,
board, or body to district court Paid by: Finney,
John A (attorney for Peck, Raymond Scott)
Receipt number: 0429543 Dated: 1/14/2010
Amount: $88.00 (Check) For: Peck, Raymond
Scott (plaintiff)

PETN

PHILLIPS

Petition for Judicial Review and Ex Parte
Application for Stay of Agency Decision

Steve Verby

1/15/2010

ORDR

PHILLIPS

Order Staying Suspension of Driving Privileges

Steve Verby

1/28/2010

NOTC

PHILLIPS

Notice of Lodging of Agency Record - from Idaho Steve Verby
Transportation Dept. (no actual record filed at
Clerk's Office - just the notice)

NOAP

OPPELT

Notice Of Appearance

Steve Verby

APER

OPPELT

Defendant: Idaho Transportation Department
Appearance Susan K. Servick

Steve Verby

2/1/2010

MISC

PHILLIPS

Demand for Record and Transcript

Steve Verby

2/2/2010

NOTC

PHILLIPS

Notice of Estimate of Transcript Cost ($100
estimate by Hedrick Court Reporting in Boise)

Steve Verby

2/16/2010

NOFG

PHILLIPS

Notice Of Filing Agency Record

Steve Verby

MISC

PHILLIPS

Agency Record

Steve Verby

NOFG

PHILLIPS

Notice Of Filing Supplemental Agency Record

Steve Verby

MISC

PHILLIPS

Transcript Dec 29,2009, ITO hearing

Steve Verby

3/31/2010

NOTC

MORELAND

Notice of Briefing Schedule on Appeal

Steve Verby

5/4/2010

BREF

OPPELT

Petitioner's Opening Brief

Steve Verby

3/2/2010

BREF

PHILLIPS

Respondent's Brief

Steve Verby

3/22/2010

BREF

PHILLIPS

Petitioner's Closing Brief

Steve Verby

5/25/2010

HRSC

CMOORE

Hearing Scheduled (Oral Argument on Appeal
09/08/2010 11 :00 AM)

Steve Verby

CMOORE

Notice of Hearing

Steve Verby

CMIN

RASOR

Court Minutes
Hearing type: Oral Argument on Appeal
Hearing date: 9/8/2010
Time: 1:37 pm
Courtroom:
Court reporter: Val Larson
Minutes Clerk: Sandra Rasor
Tape Number: 2

Steve Verby

CTLG

PHILLIPS

Hearing result for Oral Argument on Appeal held
on 09/08/2010 11 :00 AM: Court Log- Crtrm 2

Steve Verby

3/1/2010

~/8/201
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Raymond Scott Peck vs. Idaho Transportation Department
Date

Code

User

9/8/2010

DCHH

PHILLIPS

Hearing result for Oral Argument on Appeal held Steve Verby
on 09/08/2010 11 :00 AM: District Court Hearing
Held
Court Reporter: Val Larson
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: less than 100

ADVS

PHILLIPS

Hearing result for Oral Argument on Appeal held
on 09/08/2010 11 :00 AM: Case Taken Under
Advisement

Steve Verby

DEOP

PHILLIPS

Decision on Appeal

Steve Verby

CDIS

PHILLIPS

Civil Dispositio[1 entered for: Idaho Transportation Steve Verby
Department, Defendant; Peck, Raymond Scott,
Plaintiff. Filing date: 9/28/2010

STAT

PHILLIPS

STATUS CHANGED: closed

PETN

OPPELT

Steve Verby
Petition for Rehearing and/or Motion to
Reconsider and/or, Motion to Alter or Amend and
Notice of Hearing

HRSC

OPPELT

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled
12/08/2010 10:30 AM) Petition for Rehearing
and/or Motion to Reconsider and/or Motion to
Alter or Amend

Steve Verby

STAT

OPPELT

STATUS CHANGED: Closed pending clerk
action

Steve Verby

MISC

OPPELT

Copy of Order Staying Suspension of Driving
Privileges Requested by Susan Servick

Steve Verby

NOFH

OPPELT

Amended Notice Of Hearing

Steve Verby

CONT

OPPELT

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on
12/08/201010:30 AM: Continued Petition for
Rehearing and/or Motion to Reconsider and/or
Motion to Alter or Amend

Steve Verby

HRSC

OPPELT

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled
12/22/201010:00 AM) Petition for Rehearing
and/or Motion to Reconsider and/or Motion to
Alter or Amend

Steve Verby

10/26/2010

MISC

OPPELT

Copy of Order Staying Suspension of Driving
Privileges Faxed to Susan Servick

Steve Verby

12/14/2010

REPL

MORELAND

Reply to Motion to Reconsider

Steve Verby

12/22/2010

DCHH

OPPELT

Steve Verby
Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on
12/22/201010:00 AM: District Court Hearing Hell
Court Reporter: Val Larson
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Petition for Rehearing and/or Motion
to Reconsider and/or Motion to Alter or Amend Less Than 100 Pages - Taken Under Advisement
(Sue Servick by telephone)

9/28/2010

10/12/2010

10/25/2010

Judge
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Steve Verby
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Raymond Scott Peck vs. Idaho Transportation Department
Date

Code

User

12/22/2010

CMIN

ANDERSON

Court Minutes
Hearing type: Motion
Hearing date: 12/22/2010
Time: 10:03 am
Courtroom:
Court reporter: Val Larson
Minutes Clerk: Lynne Anderson
Tape Number: CTRM 1
John Finney
Susan Servick

Steve Verby

ADVS

PHILLIPS

Case Taken Under Advisement

Steve Verby

ORDR

CMOORE

Order on Petition for Rehearing

Steve Verby

CDIS

PHILLIPS

Civil Disposition entered for: Idaho Transportation Steve Verby
Department, Defendant; Peck, Raymond Scott,
Plaintiff. Filing date: 12/28/2010

STAT

PHILLIPS

STATUS CHANGED: closed

PHILLIPS

Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to Steve Verby
Supreme Court Paid by: Finney, John A
(attorney for Peck, Raymond Scott) Receipt
number: 0451311 Dated: 2/7/2011 Amount:
$101.00 (Check) For: Peck, Raymond Scott
(plaintiff)

BONT

PHILLIPS

Bond Posted for Transcript (Receipt 451315
Dated 2/7/2011 for 200.00)

Steve Verby

BNDC

PHILLIPS

Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 451316 Dated
2/7/2011 for 100.00)

Steve Verby

NOTA

KELSO

Notice of Appeal-Finney def. atty

Idaho Supreme Court

CHJG

OPPELT

Change Assigned Judge

Idaho Supreme Court

2/10/2011

STIP

PHILLIPS

Stipulation to Stay Suspension of Driving
Privileges

Steve Verby

2/11/2011

ORDR

PHILLIPS

Order Staying Suspension of Driving Privileges
Upon Further Appeal

Steve Verby

2/25/2011

SCDF

KELSO

Supreme Court Document Filed- Misc-"NOTA
Filed"-Clk's Record due to ISC 4/26/11 Due to
Atty's wlTranscripts 3/22/11-Reporter Notified

Idaho Supreme Court

SCDF

KELSO

Supreme Court Document Filed- Misc-"Clerk's
Certificate Filed"Appeal filed

Idaho Supreme Court

12/28/2010

2/7/2011

Judge

003

Steve Verby

ORIGINAL
STATE OF IDAHO
COUNTY OF BOWlER

JOHN A. FINNEY
FINNEY FINNEY & FINNEY, P.A.
Attorneys at Law
Old Power House Building
120 East Lake Street, Suite 317
Sandpoint ID 83864
Phone:
(208) 263-7712
Fax:
(208) 263-8211
ISB No. 5413

FIRST JUDICiAL DIST.
!

1010 JAN , l.f A

rr: II I

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER
RAYMOND SCOTT PECK,

)

Case No.

)

Petitioner,

)
)

v.

)
)

STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,

)
)
)

Respondent.

C'))2nfO" OOCfl '

PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW
AND
EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR STAY
OF AGENCY DECISION
Category:
Fee:

L (3)
$88.00

)
)

COMES NOW the Petitioner and files this Petition for Judicial
Review, and alleges, as follows,
1.

The Petitioner RAYMOND SCOTT PECK is a resident of

Bonner County, Idaho.
2.

This is an appeal and petition for judicial review fram

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order entered the 8~
day of January, 2010 (a true and correct copy of which is
attached hereto) by the STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION.

This appeal and petition for judicial review are

pursuant to Idaho Code § 18-8002A and §§ 67-5270 through 67-5279.

NEO 10 SlEVE VERB"
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW AND EX PARTEASS\G
"TD\C:! JUDGE
APPLICATION FOR STAY OF AGENCY DECISION () 0 4
O\S, n

3.

The Petitioner is aggrieved by the final agency action

of the Idaho Transportation Department, specifically the Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order entered the 8~ day of
January, 2010.
4.

Venue is proper in the District Court in Bonner County,

Idaho pursuant to Idaho Code § 67-5272 (c) .
5.

This filing is timely as required by Idaho Code

6.

The Petitioner contends that the actions by the

§

67-

5273.

Respondent were not supported by law or fact and/or the record
before the agency.
7.

The Petitioner was arrested and cited for allegedly

speeding and driving under the influence in violation of Idaho
Code on or about December 2, 2009.

Also, the arresting Officer

issued on December 2, 2009 and served a Notice of Suspension upon
the Defendant on or about December 3, 2009, purporting to suspend
the driving privileges of the Petitioner for a period of 90 days
set to commence 30 days from December 3, 2009.
8.

The Petitioner timely requested a hearing on the Notice

of Suspension with the Respondent.
9.

A telephonic hearing was held on December 29, 2009 with

Idaho Transportation Department Bearing Examiner Eric MOody
presiding.

Both the Petitioner and John A. Finney, Attorney,

participated in said hearings, reserving objections to the hearing
and process.

PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW AND EX PARTE
APPLICATION FOR STAY OF AGENCY DECISION - 2

005

10.

The Respondent's Hearinq Examiner failed to consider

all the arguments made by the Petitioner and/or errored in his
findinqs of fact and/or conclusions of law.
11.

The decision of the Respondent's Hearinq Examiner

should be reversed and the license suspension denied and vacated.
12.

Idaho Code § 67-5274 authorizes this Court to Stay the

decision upon appropriate terms.

The Petitioner requests the

Court to enter an Order Stayinq the imposition of a suspension of
the Petitioner's drivinq privileqes pendinq the outcome of this
petition for judicial review.
13.

The Petitioner is presently employed by Peck Dirt Works

and requires a CDL driver's license to work.
14.

If the Court does not stay the suspension of the

Petitioner's drivinq privileqes the Petitioner will suffer
irreparable injury as a result of the Respondent's failure to
follow the requirements of Idaho Code § 18-8002A and/or errors of
fact and in law.
15.

The Petitioner accepts any reasonable conditions upon

the stay that the court
16.

~oses.

The Petitioner is entitled to an award of attorney fees

aqainst the Respondent pursuant to Idaho Code

§

12-117 as i t acted

without any basis in law or fact.
WHEREFORE, the Petitioners pray for the Court to:
A.

Reverse the Findinqs of Fact and Conclusion of Law and

Order by denyinq and/or vacatinq the suspension of the
Petitioner's drivinq privileqes.

PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW AND EX PARTE
APPLICATION FOR STAY OF AGENCY DECISION - 3
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B.

Stay the Petitioner's license suspension pending the

outcome of this Petition subject to any reasonable conditions
imposed by the Court;
C.

Award the Petitioner attorney fees and costs against

the Respondent.
DATED this

c.{r:-

.J.:r

day of January, 2010.

~~'T~ "
_YFINNEY~V
BN A. FINNEY

Attorney for Petitioner

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

lL('fi-\\day

of January, 2010 a
I hereby certify that on this
true and correct copy of the foregoing, was served by deposit in
First Class, u.s. mail, postage prepaid, and was addressed to:
Idaho Attorney General - Two copies
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
Idaho Transportation Department
Administrative Bearing Section
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83707

PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW AND EX PARTE
APPLICATION FOR STAY OF AGENCY DECISION - 4
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.-.

IN THE IDAHO TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT
STATE OF IDAHO

IN THE

MATTER OF THE

DRIVING PRIVILEGES OF

RAYMOND SCOTT PECK

)
)
)
)
)
)

IDAHO D.L. No.QK306825A
FILE No. 486A00041745
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
ORDER

---------------------- )
This matter came on for Administrative License Suspension (ALS)
hearing on December 29, 2009, by telephone conference. John Finney,
Attorney at Law, represented Peck.
The suspension set out in the Notice of Suspension served
pursuant to Idaho Code §lB-B002A* is SUSTAINED.

EXHIBIT LIST

t

The hearing examiner received the following exhibits into evidence
as part of the record of the proceeding:
1. Notice of suspension
2. Evidentiary test results
3. Evidentiary test results
4. Sworn statement
5. Order
6. Copy of petitioner's driver's license
7. Envelope from law enforcement agency
8. Certificate of receipt of law enforcement documents

RECEIVED JAN 1 1 2010
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9. Petitioner's hearing request
10. Petitioner's driving record
THE HEARING EXAMINER HAS TAKEN JUDICIAL NOTICE

OF THE

FOLLOWING ITEMS:

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Records regularly maintained by ITD*
IDAPA§ Rules and manuals
ISP** standards and procedures tt for breath testing instruments
Idaho Statutes, city, and county ordinances and procedures
Reported Court Decisions
NHTSA** driving while impaired and SFSTs§§ testing manuals
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS ***

Mr.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Peck testified:
Drove east on Highway 200 and then turned south onto US 95.
Highway 200 in this area lacks buildings or structures prior to US 95.
Driving 45 mph prior to the traffic stop.
Did not complete or was asked to perform any SFSTs.
The breath test eventually produced an invalid second breath test.
6. After restarting the observation period, opened his mouth, tapped on
his chest, and then belched prior to the first breath sample.
7. The observation period was not restarted after he belched.
8. ITO's letter dated December lS, 2009, notes a rescheduled ALS
hearing on December 09,2009, at 11:00 am.

Mr. Finney's comments and arguments:
1. Peck was not properly notified of his ALS hearing.
2. Idaho Code requires the driver be given notice of certain matters
noted in Idaho Code §lS-S004, Idaho Code §lS-S004(c), and Idaho
Code § lS-S006.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSION~1

rg.. W AND ORDER - 2

3. The notice of suspension form refers to these Idaho Code sections but
does not give the consequences noted in these statutes.
4. The requirement of notifying a driver pursuant to Idaho Code §lS8002 and Idaho Code § lS-S002A has not been met.
5. Statute and the notice of suspension fail to give notice or
consequences associated with Idaho Code §49-335(2).
6. Peck has a commercial driver's license (CDL).
7. The lack of the COL consequences on the notice of suspension form
violates Peck's due process rights.
S. Exhibit 4's narrative provides no SFSTs were administered.
9. Exhibit 4's check box shows Peck had failed the SFSTs.
10. Exhibit 4's check box is contrary to Exhibit 4's narrative and Peck's
testimony.
l1.No reasonable grounds exist to request evidentiary testing.
12. Exhibit 4 does not identify evidentiary testing instrument SPD68013383 or if it was an approved ISP testing instrument.
13.Exhibit 2 notes.a simulator check number OOOS as .085.
14. Exhibit 3 notes a simulator check number 0009 as .080.
lS.There is a difference of .005 in simulator checks.
16.This difference shows doubts in Peck's actual test results.
17.There is no evidence this incident occurred within the State of Idaho.
lS. Bennett vs. ITO (147 Idaho 141) notes the manual and procedural
procedures were violated.
19.0fficer Crossley did not state that Peck did or did not belch.
20. Peck's testimony has not been contradicted.
21.0fficer Crossley noted Peck violated Idaho Code §49-654(2).
22.Testimony has not been contradicted in noting where Peck was driving.
23. Where Peck was driving, Idaho Code §49-654(2)(d) applies and allows
speeds up to 65 mph.
24.Idaho Code §49-654(2)(e) permits 55 mph in other locations.

011
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DISCUSSION

The record does show a notice dated December 18, 2009,
provides Peck's rescheduled ALS hearing was to be held on December 09,
2009. This clerical error is a minor error and a due process or Idaho Code
violation did not occur since both Peck and his attorney, Mr. Finney, were
able to attend, provide testimony and argument at this rescheduled ALS
hearing held on December 29, 2009.
ISSUES RAISED AT HEARING IN ADDITION To ISSUES SET FORTH IN
IDAHO CODE §18-8002A ttt

1. Was Peck improperly informed of his CDL disqualification?
2. Response to additional issues raised at this ALS proceeding.
FINDINGS OF FACT

I, having heard the testimony; having heard the issues raised by
the driver; having considered the exhibits admitted as evidence; having
considered the matter herein; and being advised in the premises and the

law, make the following Findings of Fact:

PURSUANT To IDAHO CODE §IS-S002A(7) THE PETITIONER HAS
THE BURDEN OF PROOF By A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE
REGARDING ALL IDAHO CODE §18-8002A STANDARDS AND ALL
ISSUES RAISED By THE PETITIONER.

1.
DID OFFICER NOLAN CROSSLEY HAVE LEGAL CAUSE To STOP THE
VEHICLE PECK WAS DRIVING?

1. Officer Crossley observed the vehicle driven by Peck travel 45 mph in
a posted 35 mph speed zone.

FINDINGS OF FACf AND CONCLUSIONS OF LA W AND ORDER - 4

2. Since Exhibit 4 specifically states a "posted speed limit" of 35 mph, it
is assumed this area of highway met the requirements of Idaho Code
§49-654(2)(a) andjor(b) even though there are no structures or
buildings in the area prior to Peck being stopped.
3. Further in supporting that the posted speed limit was 35 mph, Exhibit
4 provides Officer Crossley had issued Peck a speeding citation.
4. Peck's argument regarding the posted speed limit is unsupportive and
fails to meet his burden of proof.
5. Officer Crossley had legal cause to stop the vehicle driven by Peck.

2.
DID OFFICER CROSSLEY HAVE LEGAL CAUSE To BELIEVE PECK
VIOLATED IDAHO CODE

§lS-S004?

1. Officer Crossley observed Peck driving a motor vehicle.
2. Peck exhibited the following behaviors:
a. Smelled of an alcoholic beverage
b. Slurred speech
c. Impaired memory
d. Glassy eyes
e. Bloodshot eyes
4. Exhibit 4 notes Peck refused the SFSTs after being asked to submit to
the three field tests.
5. Exhibit 4 shows that Peck's testimony about not being asked to
perform the SFSTs is not an accurate statement.
6. Even if Exhibit 4 contains contrary statements as to whether Peck had
performed or refused all three SFSTs, in accordance to Idaho Court
rulings, Officer Crossley's minimal observations of Peck as noted in
Exhibit 4's OUI NOTES and narrative section is sufficient for Officer
Crossley to have legal cause to arrest Peck and request an evidentiary
test.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LA W AND ORDER - 5

ni~

3.
DID THE EVIDENTIARY TEST RESULTS INDICATE A VIOLATION OF
IDAHO CODE §§18-8004, 18-8004C, OR 18-8006?

1. The analyses of Peck's breath samples indicated a BrAC*'* of .083/.086.
2. Peck was in violation of Idaho Code § 18-8004.

4.
WAS THE EVIDENTIARY TEST PERFORMED IN COMPLIANCE WITH ALL
REQUIREMENTS SET FORTH IN IDAHO CODE AND ISP FORENSIC
SERVICES SOPS?

1. Officer Crossley's affidavit states the evidentiary test was performed in
compliance with Idaho Code and ISP Forensic Services SOPs.
2. I find it very doubtful that Officer Crossley would have ignored Peck
tapping his chest, opening his mouth, and then belching prior
submitting to a breath sample at 00:48 on December 03, 2009.
3. Exhibit 3's BrAC results support this conclusion in that Peck's two
subject tests only differed by .003 making the results valid subject
tests pursuant to ISP Forensic Services SOP Sections 3.2 and 3.2.3
requirements.
4. Further, this agreement noted in Exhibit 3's BrAC two tests further
strongly refute the possibility that any mouth alcohol from Peck's
"alleged" belching had skewed Exhibit 3 results before Peck was
administered an evidentiary breath test.
5. Peck's evidentiary test was performed in compliance with Idaho Code
and ISP Forensic Services SOPs.

s.
DID THE EVIDENTIARY TESTING INSTRUMENT FUNCTION PROPERLY
WHEN THE TEST WAS ADMINISTERED?

1. The evidentiary testing instrument used to test Peck's breath sample
completed a valid simulator solution check at 00:48 hours on

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LA W AND ORDER - 6

December 03, 2009.
2. The valid simulator solution check approved the instrument for
evidentiary testing in accordance with ISP Forensic Services SOP.
a. The certificate of analysis for simulator solution number 08804
provides for a range of 0.072 to 0.088 with a target value of
0.080.
b. The range difference of 0.005 between Exhibit 2 and Exhibit 3
would not have invalidated any Peck's evidentiary breath tests
pursuant to ISP Forensic Services SOP Section 2.2.
3. The evidentiary testing instrument functioned properly when the test
was administered.

6.
WAS PECK ADVISED OF THE POSSIBLE SUSPENSION OF HIS IDAHO
DRIVING PRIVILEGE?
1. Peck was read the Idaho Code §§ 18-8002 and 18-8002A advisory form
prior to submitting to the evidentiary test.
2. Idaho Code §§18-8002(3) 18-8002A(2) does not mandate a driver be
informed of the consequences noted in Idaho Code §§ 18-8004, 188004(c) and 18-8006 prior to a driver submitting, failing to complete,
or refusing an evidentiary test.
3. Peck was advised of the consequences of refusing or failing evidentiary
testing pursuant to Idaho Code §§18-8002 and 18-8002A.

7.
WAS PECK IMPROPERLY INFORMED OF HIS CDL DISQUALIFICATION?

1. Peck's due process rights were not violated in this ALS proceeding
based upon Peck's ALS suspension will disqualify his CDL license for
one year.
2. Pursuant to Idaho Code §49-335(1)(a), Peck being unable to retain his
CDL driving privileges for one year based upon a sustain ALS
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suspension is a COL disqualification and not an ALS suspension.
3. Therefore, before Peck submitted to iI.!1.X. evidentiary testing, Peck was
not required to be informed of the CDL disqualification pursuant to
Idaho Code § 18-8002(3) and Idaho Code § 18-8002A(2).
4. CDL disqualification arguments are issues to be raised in another
hearing and not this ALS hearing pursuant to Idaho Code §188002A(7).
5. Peck was properly afforded all his due process rights prior to
submitting to an evidentiary breath test.

8.
RESPONSE To ADDITIONAL ISSUES RAISED AT THIS ALS
PROCEEDING?
1. Idaho Code § 18-8002A(5)(b) sets forth what is to be contained in a
police officer's sworn statement that is forwarded to ITO.
2. Pursuant to Idaho Code, the serial number of an evidentiary breathtesting instrument is not required to be included within the police
officer's sworn statement.
3. Exhibit 4 noting "SPD Serial# 68-013383" is for another purpose and
not this ALS proceeding.
4. Since an approved evidentiary testing is admissible in this ALS
proceeding, Peck bears the burden to prove that the Intoxilyzer 5000
EN noted in Exhibit 3 was not approved as an evidentiary breathtesting instrument.
5. As the result of Peck failing to present evidence in showing Exhibit 3's
Intoxilyzer 5000 EN was not approval by ISP, Peck's argument fails.
6. The top of Exhibit 4 on the first page plainly states IN THE DISTRICT
COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER (emphasis added).
7. Exhibit 4 shows this incident occurred in Idaho.
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CONCLUSION OF LAW

CONFLICTING FACTS, IF ANY, WERE CONSIDERED AND
REJECTED IN FAVOR OF THE FOREGOING CITED FACTS.
BASED UPON THE FOREGOING FINDINGS OF FACT, I
CONCLUDE THAT ALL OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR
SUSPENSION OF THE PETITIONER'S DRIVING PRIVILEGES
SET FORTH IN IDAHO CODE §§18-S002 AND lS-S002A
WERE COMPLIED WITH IN THIS CASE.
THE FOLLOWING ORDER IS RENDERED:
ORDER

The suspension set out in the Notice of Suspension served
pursuant to Idaho Code §18-S002A is SUSTAINED and
shall run for a period of 90 DAYS commencing on January
02, 2010, and remain in effect through April 02, 2010.
DATED this

oath day of January

2010

Eric G. Moody
ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING EXAMINER
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Endnotes
. Idaho's Implied Consent Statute
t Idaho Transportation Department's (lTD hereafter) exhibits are numeric,
Petitioner's exhibits are alpha
, Idaho Transportation Department
§ Idaho's Administrative Procedure Act
** Idaho State Police

Hereafter SOPs
*' National Highway Transportation Safety Administration
55 Standardized field sobriety tests
*** Argument and testimony is summarized from record of hearing
1-tt Issues addressed under Idaho Code § 18-8002A(7) will not be repeated
under Petitioner's issues
*** Breath Alcohol Concentration
tt
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FINAL ORDER
(Hearings pursuant to section 18-8002A, I.C.)

This is a final order of the Department.
A motion for reconsideration may be filed with the Idaho Transportation
Department's Administrative License Suspension Hearing Unit, PO Box
7129, Boise, ID 83707-1129 within fourteen (14) days of the issue date
of this order. If the hearing officer fails to act upon this motion within
twenty-one (21) days of its receipt, the motion will be deemed denied.
Or, pursuant to sections 67-5270 and 67-5272, Idaho Code, any party
aggrieved by this final order or orders previously issued in this case may
appeal this final order and all previously issued orders in this case to
district court by filing a petition for judicial review in the district court of
the county in which:

1.

A hearing was held;

2.

The final agency actions were taken; or

3.

The party seeking review of the order resides.

An appeal must be filed within twenty-eight (28) days of the issue date of
this final order. The filing of an appeal to district court does not itself stay
the effectiveness or enforcement of the order under appeal.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day of January 2010, I mailed a true and
accurate copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW AND ORDER by depositing the same in the United States mail, postage
prepaid, addressed to:

John A. Finney
Attorney at Law
120 East Lake Street
Suite 317
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864-1366
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OR\G\NAL

ST~TE Of IDAHO
COUNTY Of BOHNER
fiRST JUDICIAL OiST.

JOHN A. FINNEY
FrNNEY FINNEY & FINNEY, P.A.
Attorneys at Law
01d Power Bouse Building
120 East Lake Street, Suite 317
Sandpoint ID 83864
Phone:
(208) 263-7712

Fax:
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CLERK D1SiRlC T COU,,!

(208) 263-8211
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ISB No. 5413

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER
RAYMOND SCOTT PECK,

)

Case No.

)

Petitioner,

)
)

v.

GV 7,.D l a. bolj l

ORDER STAYING SUSPENSION OF
DRIVING PRIVILEGES

)
)

STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,

)
)
)

Respondent.

)
)

The Petitioner's Ex Parte Application For Stay of Agency
Decision coming before the Court, and for good cause appearing, IT
IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1.

The suspension of RAYMOND SCOTT PECK's driving

privileges set out in the Notice of Suspension dated December 2,

2009 and served on or about December 3, 2009 is stayed pending
final resolution of this matter on the fo11owing conditions:

2.

Upon RAYMOND SCOTT PECK's comp1iance with the above

conditions, and pending further order of the Court, RAYMOND SCOTT
ORDER STAYING SUSPENSION OF DRIVING

PRIVI~

1" 1

I

PECK's Idaho Driver's License No. #QK306825A and driving
privileges are valid.
3.

The Idaho Transportation Department is Ordered to

return RAYMOND SCOTT PECK's drivers license to him immediately.
4.

This Order shall operate as RAYMOND SCOTT PECK's

drivers license until receipt of his driver's license from the
Idaho

Transporta~~

Dated this

~

Department.

day of

JlU'IlA.~.

2010.

CERTIFICATE OF CLERK'S RULE 77(d) SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy, with the
clerk's filing stamp thereon showing the date of filing, of the
foregoing, was served by deposit in First Class, U.S. Mail,
postage prepaid, this
Is day of January, 2010, and was
addressed as follows:

-~~~/~~

John A. Finney
Finney Finney & Finney, ~~~
Attorneys at Law
Old Power Bouse Building
120 East Lake Street, Suite 317
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864

Idaho Attorney General
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010

Idaho Transportation Department
Administrative Bearing Section
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83707

{)~rZ: ClerlE
A~~
""""--0
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ORDER STAYING SUSPENSION OF DRrvING PRrvILEGES - 2
1\00

STATE OF IDAHO
COUNTY OF BONNER
FIRST JUDICIAL OIST.

Judith Cahoon
Administrative Assistant, Driver Services
Idaho Transportation Department
3311 West State Street
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83701-1129
Telephone: (208) 334-8637
Facsimile: (208) 332-2002
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER
RAYMOND SCO'IT PECK,

)

)

Petitioner,

v.
State of Idaho,
Department of Transportation
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No.

CV 2010·0047

NOTICE OF LODGING
OF AGENCY RECORD

----------------------------)
Judith Cahoon, Administrative Assistant of the Idaho Transportation Department, hereby
gives notice pursuant to LR.C.P. 84(j) of lodging of the agency record in the above-captioned
matter. The parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of the mailing of this notice in
which to file with the agency any objections. If no objections to the record are filed with the
agency within fourteen (14) days, the record shall be deemed settled. Parties may pick up a copy
of the record between the hours of 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. at the Idaho Transportation
Department, 3311 West State Street, Boise, Idaho 83703.
The Agency Record consists of the following documents:
Page Number

Description

1-2

Notice of Suspension - STATE'S EXHIBIT 1
NOTICE OF LODGING OF AGENCY RECORD - 1

023

Evidentiary Test Results - STATE'S EXHIBIT 2
Evidentiary Test Results - STATE'S EXHIBIT 3
Sworn Statement - STATE'S EXHIBIT 4
Order - STATE'S EXHIBIT 5
Copy of Petitioner's Driver's License - STATE'S EXHIBIT 6
Envelope from Law Enforcement Agency - STATE'S EXHIBIT 7
Certification of Receipt of Law Enforcement
Documents - STATE'S EXHIBIT 8
Petitioner's Request for Hearing - STATE'S EXHIBIT 9
Petitioner's Driver License Record - STATE'S EXHIBIT 10
Notice of Telephone Hearing
Pending Action
Petition for Judicial Review and Ex Parte Application for Stay of
Agency Decision
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order
Correspondence

3
4
5-8
9
10
11
12
13-14
15-19
20-25
26-27
28-45
46-57
58

As of this DATE, January 26, 2010, a Transcript has [ ], has not [X] been requested by
the petitioner or his attorney.

DATED this 26th day of January, 2010.

J ith Cahoon
Idaho Transportation Department
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 26th day of January, 2010, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
JOHN FINNEY
ATTORNEY AT LAW
120 EAST LAKE ST STE 317
SANDPOINT ID 83864

-X-U.S. MAIL
_HAND DELIVERED
_OVERNIGHT MAIL
_TELECOPY (FAX)

SUSAN SERVICK
ATTORNEY AT LAW

-X-ELECTRONIC MAIL
_HAND DELIVERED
_OVERNIGHT MAIL
_TELECOPY (FAX)

I aho Transportation Department

NOTICE OF LODGING OF AGENCY RECORD - 3

025

STATE OF IDAHO
COUNTY OF BmmEr~
FIRST JUDICIAL DIST.

Elise Rising
Administrative Assistant, Driver Services
Idaho Transportation Department
33 11 West State Street
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83701-1129
Telephone: (208) 334-4443
Facsimile: (208) 332-2002
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER

RA YMOND SCOTT PECK,
Petitioner,
v.
State of Idaho,
Department of Transportation
Respondent.

)
)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No.

CV-2010-0047

NOTICE OF FILING
AGENCY RECORD

Pursuant to 1.R.c.P. 84(k), the attached agency record in the above entitled matter is now
deemed settled and is hereby filed.
DATED this 12th day of February, 2010.

sing
Idaho Transportation Department
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 12th day of February, 2010, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
~U.S.MAIL

JOHN FINNEY
ATTORNEY AT LAW
120 EAST LAKE ST, STE 317
SANDPOINT, ID 83864

HAND DELIVERED
OVERNIGHT MAIL
_TELECOPY (FAX)

~ELECTRONIC

SUSAN SERVICK
ATTORNEY AT LAW

MAIL
HAND DELIVERED
OVERNIGHT MAIL
_TELECOPY (FAX)

~~

Eli
'sing
Idaho Transportation Department
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;)~.

SUSAN K. SERVICK
Special Deputy Attorney General
618 North 4th Street
PO Box 2900
Coeur d' Alene, Idaho 83816
Phone: (208) 667-1486
Fax: (208) 667-1825
ISBN 3443
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Attorney for Respondent Idaho Department of Transportation
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER
RAYMOND SCOTT PECK,

CASE NO. CVI0-00047

Petitioner,
vs.

NOTICE OF FILING SUPPLEMENTAL
GENCY RECORD

STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,
Res ondent.
COMES NOW, Respondent State of Idaho, Department of Transportation
(hereinafter "Respondent"), by and through its attorney, SUSAN K. SERVICK, Special
Deputy Attorney General, and files with this Court a supplemental document recently
added to the Agency Record. This document consists of the transcript of the
administrative proceeding. Petitioner has fourteen (14) days from the date of filing this
transcript within which to object or otherwise request additions to the Agency Record. If
no objection is made or addition requested, the record shall be deemed complete and
settled as of the fourteenth day after the filing of this transcript. The Petitioner's brief
shall then be due approximately thirty five (35) days later and Respondent's brief shall be
due approximately twenty-eight (28) days after receipt of Petitioner's brief, or according
to any scheduling order entered herein.
I hereby certify that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, the enclosed
document is true a correct, and that, together with the original Agency Record filed in

NOTICE OF FILING SUPPLEMENTAL AGENCY RECORD - 1
"no

this matter, the Agency Record filed with this Court is complete. The Department has
retained the original file.
The following is a listing of the documents constituting the supplement to the
Agency Record:

1.

Transcript of the administrative proceeding held on December 29,2009.

Dated February '2S ,2010.

.

L~I!
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Susan K. Servick
Special Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that true and correct copies of the NOTICE OF FILING
SUPPLEMENTAL AGENCY RECORD were transmitted, February 25, 2010 by the
following method, to:

JOHN A. FINNEY
Attorney at Law
120 East Lake Street, Suite 317
Sandpoint,ID 83864
Fax: 208 263-8211

V'

Fax
US Mail

L~KLvlcL

Susan K. Servick

NOTICE OF FILING SUPPLEMENTAL AGENCY RECORD - 2

ORIGINA~L
JOHN A. FINNEY
FINNEY FINNEY' FINNEY, P.A.
Attorneys at Law
Old Power House Building
120 East Lake Street, Suite 317
Sandpoint ID 83864
Phone:
(208) 263-7712

Fax:

(208) 263-8211

ISS No. 5413

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER
RAYMOND SCOTT PECK,

)

Case No. CV-2010-0047

)

Petitioner,

)

PETITIONER'S OPENING BRIEF

)

v.

)
)

STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,

)
)
)

Respondent.

)
)

COMES NOW the Petitioner and files this Petitioner's Opening
Brief, as follows:

I. INTRODUCTION' FACTS
The Petitioner Raymond Scott Peck is a resident of Bonner
County, Idaho.

On December 2, 2009, the Petitioner Peck turned

left from the Wily Widgeon driveway onto Highway 200 traveling on
Highway 200 to the intersection on US 95, and continued traveling
southbound on US 95.
in length.

The distance Peck traveled exceeded 600 feet

Sandpoint Police Officer Nolan Crossley initiated a

traffic stop for traveling 45 miles per hour prior to the North
PETITIONER'S OPENING BRIEF - 1
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Center.

There are no structures along the highway for

the entire distance traveled by Peck prior to the stop being
initiated.
During the traffic stop, Peck did not complete any field
sobriety tests.

At the station, while in custody, following the

first 15 minute observation period, Peck submitted to the breath
test, with an invalid result.

A second 15 minute observation

period was commenced, during which time Peck opened his mouth and
belched, and also patted or tapped on his chest with his fist, all
in the presence of the officer.
observation period was commenced.

No additional or new 15 minute
Less than one minute elapsed

between the time of the belch and the breath testing conducted.
The breach test results were .083/.086.
The Petitioner Peck was cited by SPD Citation No. 41744 with
a violation of "Excess of Max Speed Limit 49-654(2) 45 mph in
posted 35 mph zone" which was Bonner County Case No. CR-2009-7986,
which was subsequently dismissed.

The Petitioner Peck was also

cited by SPD Citation No. 41745 with a violation of "DUI 18-8004
(.083)" which was Bonner County Case No. CV-2009-7792 which was
subsequently resolved by a plea of guilty and a withheld judgment
to an amended charge of inattentive driving.

II. IMPROPER HEARING NOTICE
As set forth in the Record, pages 20 to 25, the hearing
conducted December 29, 2009 was not the hearing date for the
matter.

The Notice of Telephonic Hearing and Show Cause Letter,

each dated December 15, 2009, R. p. 20-21, provided for hearing
officer Mark Richmond and a hearing date of December 29, 2009.
PETITIONER'S OPENING BRIEF - 2
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The Notice of Telephonic Hearing and Show Cause Letter, each dated
December 18, 2009, R. p. 22-25 provided for the hearing to be
December 9, 2009 before hearing officer Eric Moody.

The hearing

was not conducted pursuant to the noticed date of December 9,
2009, nor in compliance with the statutory provisions of Idaho
Code 18-8002A.

Thus, the decision should be vacated.

III. LACK OF NOTICE, VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS
The Notice of Suspension for.m, R. p. 1-2 Exhibit 1, fails to
satisfy the notice requirements of Idaho Code and due process, as
i t fails to give notice of the provisions of Idaho Code § 49335(2) which provides that "[a]ny person who operates a commercial
motor vehicle or who holds a class A, B or C driver's license is
disqualified from operating a commercial vehicle for a period of
not less that one (1) year if the person refuses to submit to or
submits to and fails a test to deter.mine the driver's alcohol,
drug or other intoxicating substances concentration while
operating a motor vehicle."
There is no implied and no infor.med consent as it relates to
the punitive "disqualification" and the testing without such
consent violates due process.

Thus the decision should be

vacated.

IV. THE AFFIDAVIT AND TEST RESULTS ARE LACKING
The Affidavit and test results used to sustain the
suspension (Exhibits 2, 3, & 4) are defective in that they fail
to identify the alleged acts as occurring in the State of Idaho,
indicate Sim. Check No. 0008 and 0009 having variations of .005,
PETITIONER'S OPENING BRIEF - 3
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and show the officer stating in the narrative matters contrary to
the check the box portion of affidavit.

Taken as a whole, the

credibility of the affidavit and test results is lacking on its
face.

This argument is not that there are technical defects or

lacking defects in the Department's documentation, bur rather
credibility is lacking to support the alleged facts and/or
suspension.

Thus the decision should be vacated.

V. NO GROUNDS FOR STOP
The Affidavit used to sustain the suspension (Exhibit 4) and
the traffic citation No. 41744 asserts the basis for the stop as
traveling 45 mph in a posted 35 mph zone, with visual estimation
and radar indicating 45 mph, in violation of Idaho Code § 49654(2) .
Idaho Code § 49-654(2) contains two provisions for 35 mile
per hour speed zones, specifically in subparagraphs (a) and (b),
as follows:
(a)

Thirty-five (35) miles per hour or a lesser maximum
speed adopted pursuant to section 49-207(2) (a), Idaho
Code, in any residential, business, or urban district.

(b)

Thirty-five (35) miles per hour in any urban district.

Idaho Code § 49-105(11) provides the definition for district
as follows: "District" means:
(a)

Business district. The territory contiguous to and
including a highway when within any six hundred (600)
feet along the highway there are buildings in use for
business or industrial purposes, including hotels,
banks or office buildings, railroad stations and public
buildings which occupy at least three hundred (300)
feet of frontage on one side or three hundred (300)
feet collectively on both sides of the highway.
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(b)

Residentia1 district. The territory contiguous to and
inc1uding a highway not comprising a business district
when the property on the highway for a distance of
three hundred (300) feet or more is in the main
improved with residences, or residences and buildings
in use for business.

(c)

Urban district. The territory contiguous to and
inc1uding any highway which is bui1t up with structures
devoted to business, industry or dwelling houses. For
purposes of establishing speed limits in accordance
with the provisions of section 49-654, Idaho Code, no
state highway or any portion thereof 1ying within the
boundaries of an urban district is subject to the
1imitations which otherwise apply to nonstate highways
within an urban district. Provided, this subsection
sha1l not limit the authority of the duly e1ected
officials of an incorporated city acting as a 10ca1
authority to decrease speed limits on state highways
passing through any district within the incorporated
city.

There is no testimony or evidence in the record by the
Officer other than the genera1 assertion of a posted speed 1imit
of 35 mph.

There is no factual statement of any specific sign or

posting of a speed 1imit.

There is no testimony or evidence in

the record by the Officer or otherwise, as to the speed zone, and
the uncontroverted testimony of the Petitioner Peck is that there
were no bui1dings or structures occupying the sides of the
highway that wou1d meet the statutory definition of business
district, residentia1 district, or urban district.

There were no

structures or buildings in use for business or industria1
purposes, inc1uding hote1s, banks or office bui1dings, rai1road
stations and public buildings (Business District).

There were no

structures or bui1dings in the main improved with residences, or
residences and bui1dings in use for business (Residentia1
District).

There were no structures or buildings bui1t up with

structures devoted to business, industry or dwe1ling houses
PETITIONER'S OPENING BRIEF - 5
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(Urban District).

Therefore, the speed limit on Highway 200 and

US 95 in that location is controlled by Idaho Code § 49-654(2) (d)
providing for 65 miles per hour.
When presented with the uncontroverted facts and argument,
the hearing examiner concluded in the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and Order entered the 8~day of January, 2010
(R. pages 49-50) that " ... it is assumed this area of highway met
the requirements of Idaho Code §49-654 (2) (a) and/or (b) even
though there are no structures or buildings in the area prior to
Peck being stopped."

The hearing examiner cannot "assume"

matters not in the record, contrary to the statutory basis for
the stop, and/or controverted by specific uncontested testimony
of the Petitioner.

See Bennett v. lTD, 147 Idaho 141 (Id.App.

2009), discussed in further detail below.

Thus, the hearing

officer's finding that the grounds existed for the stop is not
supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole and
the decision should be vacated.

VI .

INVALID BAC TESTS
Pursuant to I.C. § 18-8004(4), the Idaho State Police are

charged with promulgating standards for administering tests for
breath alcohol content and the ISP has issued operating manuals
establishing procedures for the maintenance and operation of
breath test equipment.
659,

Pursuant to In Re Mahurin, 140 Idaho 656,

(Idaho App. 2004), noncompliance with the maintenance and

operation procedures is a ground for vacating an administrative
license suspension under I.C. § 18-8002A(7) (d).

As set forth in

State v. Carson, 133 Idaho 451, 453 (Idaho App. 1999) and Bennett
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v. Idaho Dept. of Transportation, 147 Idaho 141, 144-145 (Idaho
App. 2009), the pertinent portion of the manual instructs:
Observe the subject for 15 minutes. During this time, the
subject may not smoke, consume alcohol, belch, vomit, use
chewing tobacco, or have any other substance in the mouth.
If belching or vomiting does occur or something is found in
the mouth, wait an additional 15 minutes.
Peck testified that he belched during the monitoring period,
less than a minute before taking the breath test.

The monitoring

period is required in order to rule out the possibility that
alcohol or other substances have been introduced into the
subject's mouth from the outside or by belching or regurgitation.
Carson, 133 Idaho at 453.

Only the officer's probable cause

affidavit was submitted to the record in support of the
suspension.

The officer's form affidavit provides only

generalized statements regarding employment of proper procedures.
Peck presented uncontroverted specific facts of the belch.
Peck met the burden to prove grounds to vacate the
suspension of his license as he testified to the belch.

The

hearing officer did not find Peck's testimony to lack
credibility.

When presented with the uncontroverted specific

facts and argument, the hearing examiner concluded in the
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order entered the 8~
day of January, 2010 (R. page 51) that the test was performed in
compliance with the standards.

Peck's testimony demonstrates

that proper monitoring procedures were not followed, and that the
test for alcohol concentration was, therefore, not conducted in
accordance with the requirements of I.C. § 18-8004(4).

The

officer's general, non-specific affidavit is insufficient to
support a finding when compared to the credible evidence of Peck
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that demonstrates a violation of proper procedures.

See

generally Bennett v. Idaho Dept. of Transportation, 147 Idaho
141, 144-145 (Idaho App. 2009).

Thus, the hearing officer's

finding that the breath test was conducted in compliance with
procedural standards is directly contrary to the Bennett holding,
and is not supported by substantial evidence in the record as a
whole and the decision should be vacated.

VII. ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS
Peck is entitled to recover attorney fees against the State
of Idaho, Department of Transportation, pursuant to Idaho Code §
12-117, which governs the award of attorney fees in proceedings
between persons and state agencies and provides:
Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any
administrative or civil judicial proceeding involving
as adverse parties a state agency, a city, a county or
other taxing district and a person, the court shall
award the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees,
witness fees and reasonable expenses, if the court
finds that the party against whom the judgment is
rendered acted without a reasonable basis in fact or
law.
(Emphasis added). Idaho Code § 12-117 is not a discretionary
statute.

It provides that the court shall award attorney fees

upon a finding that the state agency did not act with a reasonable
basis in fact or law.

Idaho Dept. of Law Enforcement v. Kluss,

125 Idaho 682, 685 (1994).

The policy behind I.C. § 12-117 is:

"1) to serve as a deterrent to groundless or arbitrary agency
action; and 2) to provide a remedy for persons who have borne
unfair and unjustified financial burdens defending against
groundless charges or attempting to correct mistakes agencies
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never should ha [vel made."

~

(quoting Bogner v. State Dep' t of

Revenue & Taxation, 107 Idaho 854, 859 (1984».
Appeals from agency actions to the District Court are
governed by I.R.C.P. 84.

Attorney fee statues, such as Idaho Coda

§ 12-117, are applicable on appeal to the District Court.

The

procedure for deter.mining the amount of such fees is governed by
Idaho Appellate Rules 35 and 41.

I.R.C.P. 84(r).

Here, the Department's hearing officer's decision has no
basis in law or fact to uphold the Petitioner's suspension.

The

hearing officer cannot ignore credible, specific, and
uncontroverted evidence or make conclusions directly contrary to
law.

The conduct invokes both purposes of the statutory policy,

and attorney fees should be awarded to the Petitioner to
discourage such conduct and to allow recovery for the unjustified
financial burden placed on the Petitioner by the hearing officer's
erroneous decision based upon assumptions and decisions not
support by the case law or the specific credible facts.

VIII. CONCLUSION
As set forth above, for any of the several grounds asserted,
the decision of the Hearing Examiner sustaining the Notice of
Suspension should be vacated.

The relief sought is to reverse

the Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law and Order by denying
and/or vacating the suspension of the Petitioner's driving
privileges, to reinstate the driving privileges, and for an award
to the Petitioner of attorney fees and costs against the
Respondent.
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DATED this

~day
~

of May, 2010.
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INNEY FINNEY & FINNEY, P.A.
Attorney for Petitioner
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

L4~

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was served by U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, this ~
day of May, 2010, and was addressed to:

Susan K. Servick
Special Deputy Attorney General
618 North 4~ Street
P.O. Box 2900
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816
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Special Deputy Attorney General
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Attorney for Respondent Idaho Department of Transportation

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER
RAYMOND SCOTT PECK,

CASE NO. CVI0-00047

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,
Res ondent.

This is a response brief of the Idaho Transportation Department. Petitioner
Raymond Scott Peck (Peck) requests this Court to reverse the decision of the
Department's Hearing Officer, who determined that the requirements of Idaho Code
Section 18-8002A were met and that Peck's driving privileges should be suspended for
ninety (90) days.

I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On December 2,2009, Peck was arrested for Driving Under the Influence (DUI)
by Sandpoint Police Officer Nolan Crossley in Bonner County, Idaho. Officer Crossley
was conducting stationary speed enforcement on Highway 95 across from the North Info
Center. Agency Record, page 6. He observed a vehicle traveling 45 mph in a 35 mph
posted speed zone.

Officer Crossley activated his overhead lights and stopped the

vehicle. Id. He contacted the driver, who was identified as Raymond Peck, Jr. Id The
officer detected an odor of alcohol. Id Peck refused to perform field sobriety tests. Peck
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was arrested and transported to the Sandpoint Police Department. Peck was then given
an evidentiary breath test and Peck's results were .089/xxl.083/.086.

Id Officer

Schneider served Peck with a Notice of Suspension and issued a permit for temporary
driving privileges. See Agency Record, page 1-2.
Peck requested an administrative hearing on the proposed license suspension.
The administrative hearing was held on December 29,2009 before Hearing Officer Eric
Moody. See Hearing Transcript. During the hearing, Peck testified and the officer did
not. Id
On January 8, 2010, the hearing officer issued his decision which sustained the
ninety (90) day license suspension. See Agency Record, pages 39-57. In summary, the
hearing officer found:
(1) Officer Crossley had legal cause to approach Peck's vehicle;
(2) Officer Crossley had legal cause to believe Peck had violated Idaho Code
Section 18-8004;
(3) That the evidentiary tests indicated that Peck was in violation of Idaho Code
Section 18-8004;
(4) That the evidentiary tests were performed in compliance with all requirements
set forth in Idaho Code and ISP Forensic Services Standard Operating
Procedures;
(5) That the evidentiary testing instrument functioned properly when the test was

administered;
(6) That Peck was advised of the possible suspension of his Idaho Driver's
privileges; and
(7) That Peck was not required to be informed of the CDL disqualification at the
time of his arrest, pursuant to Idaho Code Section 18-8002(3) and 188002A(2).
Id

On January 14, 2010, the Petitioner filed a Petition for Judicial Review. See
Agency Record, page 50-54. On January 15,2010, Honorable Judge Steve Yerby issued
an Order Staying the driver's license suspension pending this appeal.
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Petitioner also writes that Peck's speeding ticket was dismissed and his DUI
charge was resolved by a guilty plea and withheld judgment to an amended charge of
inattentive driving. This evidence is not part of the record on this appeal and not relevant
to this appeal. Judicial review of the hearing officer's decision is generally confined to
the record unless the party requesting the additional evidence can demonstrate that the
evidence falls within the statutory exceptions provided for in Idaho Code Section 675276. None of the exceptions apply herein.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The administrative license suspension (ALS) statute, I.C. § 18-8002A, requires
that the lTD suspend the driver's license of a driver who has failed a BAC test
administered by a law enforcement officer. Bennett v. State, Dept. ofTransp., 147 Idaho
141, 206 P.3d 505 (Idaho App. 2009). The period of suspension is ninety days for a

driver's first failure of an evidentiary test and one year for any subsequent test failure
within five years. I.C. § 18-8002A(4)(a). A person who has been notified of an ALS may
request a hearing before a hearing officer designated by the lTD to contest the
suspension. I.C. § 18-8002A(7). At the administrative hearing, the burden of proof rests
upon the driver to prove any of the grounds to vacate the suspension.I.C. § 18-8002A(7);
Kane v. State, Deptt ofTransp., 139 Idaho 586, 590, 83 P.3d 130, 134 (Ct.App.2003).

The hearing officer must uphold the suspension unless he or she finds, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the driver has shown one of several grounds
enumerated in I.C. § 18-8002A(7) for vacating the suspension. Those grounds include:
(a) The peace officer did not have legal cause to stop the person; or
(b) The officer did not have legal cause to believe the person had been driving or
was in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol,
drugs or other intoxicating substances in violation of the provisions of section 188004, 18-8004C or 18-8006, Idaho Code; or
(c) The test results did not show an alcohol concentration or the presence of drugs
or other intoxicating substances in violation of section 18-8004, 18-8004C or 188006, Idaho Code; or
(d) The tests for alcohol concentration, drugs or other intoxicating substances
administered at the direction of the peace officer were not conducted in
accordance with the requirements of section 18-8004(4), Idaho Code, or the
testing equipment was not functioning properly when the test was administered;
or
(e) The person was not informed of the consequences of submitting to evidentiary
testing as required in subsection (2) of this section.
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I.C. § 18-8002A(7). The hearing officer's decision is subject to challenge through a
petition for judicial review. I.C. § 18-8002A(8); Kane, 139 Idaho at 589, 83 P.3d at 133.
The Idaho Administrative Procedures Act (I.D.A.P.A.) governs the review of
department decisions to deny, cancel, suspend, disqualify, revoke, or restrict a person's
driver's license. See I.C. §§ 49-201,49-330,67-5201(2),67-5270. Recently, in Bennett v.

State Department of Transportation, 147 Idaho 141, 206 P.3d 505 (Ct App 2009), the
Court of Appeals restated the necessary standard of review for the Court. The Court
stated, in pertinent part:
This Court does not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight
of the evidence presented. I.e. § 67-5279(1); Marshall, 137 Idaho at 340, 48 P.3d
at 669. This Court instead defers to the agency's findings of fact unless they are
clearly erroneous. Castaneda v. Brighton Corp., 130 Idaho 923, 926, 950 P.2d
1262, 1265 (1998); Marshall, 137 Idaho at 340, 48 P.3d at 669. In other words,
the agency's factual determinations are binding on the reviewing court, even
where there is conflicting evidence before the agency, so long as the
determinations are supported by substantial competent evidence in the record.
Urrutia v. Blaine County, ex rei. Bd. ofComm'rs, 134 Idaho 353,357,2 P.3d 738,
742 (2000); Marshall, 137 Idaho at 340, 48 P.3d at 669.
A court may overturn an agency's decision where its findings, inferences,
conclusions, or decisions: (a) violate statutory or constitutional provisions; (b)
exceed the agency's statutory authority; (c) are made upon unlawful procedure;
(d) are not supported by substantial evidence in the record; or (e) are arbitrary,
capricious, or an abuse ofdiscretion.I.C. § 67-5279(3). The party challenging the
agency decision must demonstrate that the agency erred in a manner specified in
I.C. § 67-5279(3) and that a substantial right ofthat party has been prejudiced.
Price v. Payette County Bd. ofCounty Comm'rs, 131 Idaho 426, 429,958 P.2d
583,586 (1998); Marshall, 137 Idaho at 340,48 P.3d at 669. If the agency's
decision is not affirmed on appeal, "it shall be set aside ... and remanded for
further proceedings as necessary." I.C. § 67-5279(3).

/d., at 506-507. Therefore, the burden is on the Petitioner to establish that lTD erred in a
manner specified in Idaho Code Section 67-5279(3), and then establish that a substantial
right has been prejudiced.

III. CHARACTERIZATION OF THE ISSUES
For the purpose of this ALS appeal, the Petitioner's Brief raises several issues:
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1.

Was the Notice of Hearing inadequate such that the suspension should be

vacated?
2.

Was the Notice of Suspension inadequate because it failed to advise

Petitioner of the requirements ofIdaho Code Section 49-335(2)?
3.

Are the documents used to support the suspension inadequate because they

fail to identify the alleged acts as occurring in Idaho?
4.

Did the officer have probable cause to stop Peck?

5.

Were the BAC tests done properly?

6.

Is Petitioner entitled to attorney fees?

IV. ADEQUATE HEARING NOTICE
Petitioner contends that his notice of the ALS hearing was not adequate and
requires that his driver's license suspension be vacated. This argument is without merit.
The Agency Record reveals the following:
1.

December 8, 2009 letter from attorney John Finney requesting a hearing
on the ALS suspension. The letter was sent via fax, therefore this hearing
officer will assume it was received by the Department on December 8,
2009. Agency Record, page 12-13.

2.

December 15, 2009 letter from lTD with a Show Cause Letter with notice
that the hearing date was extended due to a conflict in the hearing
examiner's schedule. Agency Record, page 21.

3.

December 15, 2009 letter from lTD with Notice of Telephonic Hearing to
be held on December 29,2009 with Hearing Officer Mark Richmond at
11 :OOMT. Agency Record, page 20.

4.

December 18, 2009 letter from lTD with Notice of Telephonic Hearing to
be held on December 9, 2009 with Hearing Officer Eric Moody at
11 :OOMT. Agency Record, page 22. I

1 Interestingz, this Notice must contain a typographical error since the Notice contains a hearing date of
December 9 ,that precedes the date of the letter (December 18th ). This Notice probably should have read
December 29 th , not December 9 rh •
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5.

December 18, 2009 letter from lTD with Show Cause Letter stating the
hearing date was extended because of a change in the hearing officer.
Agency Record, page 24.

6.

Ultimately the hearing was held on December 29, 2009 before Hearing
Officer Eric Moody at 11 :00 MT. Agency Record, page 32 and Transcript,
page 1.

Idaho Code Section 18-8002A(7) provides in pertinent part:
(7) Administrative hearing on suspension. A person wo has been served with a
notice of suspension after submitting to an evidentiary test may request an
administrative hearing on the suspension before a hearing officer designated by
the department. The request for hearing shall be in writing and must be received
by the department within seven (7) calendar days of the date of service upon the
person of the notice of suspension, and shall include what issue or issues shall be
raised at the hearing. The date on which the hearing request was received shall be
noted on the face of the request.
If a hearing is requested, the hearing shall be held within twenty (20) days of

the date the hearing request was received by the department unless this
period is, for good cause shown, extended by the hearing officer for one ten
(10) day period. Such extension shall not operate as a stay of the suspension and
any temporary permit shall expire thirty (30) days after service of the notice of
suspension, notwithstanding an extension of the hearing date beyond such thirty
(30) day period. Written notice of the date and time of the hearing shall be sent to
the party requesting the hearing at least seven (7) days prior to the scheduled
hearing date. The department may conduct all hearings by telephone if each
participant in the hearing has an opportunity to participate in the entire proceeding
while it is taking place. [emphasis added].
Here, the hearing was held on December 29, 2009. This hearing date was within
the time allowable by the statute (twenty days plus an extension by the hearing officer).
There also was apparently no confusion on the part of the Petitioner regarding the date of
the hearing. Therefore, no substantial right of the Petitioner was violated.
V. THE NOTICE OF SUPSENSION PROVIDES ADEQUATE NOTICE
Petitioner argues that the Notice of Suspension is not adequate because it failed to
inform him of the provisions and consequences of Idaho Code Section 49-335(2). Peck
does not argue that he did not receive the admonitions required by Idaho Code Sections
18-8002 and 18-8002A. Instead, he invites this Court to add language to those code
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sections by including other consequences to the Suspension Advisory form. This Court
should decline the invitation.
The hearing officer concluded that the notice given to Peck complied with Idaho
law and found:
1.

Peck was read the Idaho Code Sections 18-8002 and 18-8002A advisory
form prior to submitting to the evidentiary test.

2.

Idaho Code Sections 18-8002(3) 18-8002A(2) does not mandate a driver
be informed of the consequences noted in Idaho Code section 18-8004,
18-8004(c) and 18-8006 prior to a driver submitting, failing to complete,
or refusing an evidentiary test.

3.

Peck was advised of the consequences of refusing or failing evidentiary
testing pursuant to Idaho Code Sections 18-8002 and 18-8002A.

Agency Record, page 52. The Hearing Officer's conclusion on this issue was correct.
Idaho law sets forth the requirements for the notice provided to drivers before
taking the evidentiary breath test. Idaho Code Section 18-8002A(2) states in pertinent
part:
(2) Information to be given. At the time of evidentiary testing for concentration of
alcohol, or for the presence of drugs or other intoxicating substances is requested,
the person shall be informed that if the person refuses to submit to or fails to
complete evidentiary testing, or if the person submits to and completes
evidentiary testing and the test results indicate an alcohol concentration or the
presence of drugs or other intoxicating substances in violation of section 18-8004,
18-8004C or 18-8006, Idaho Code, the person shall be informed substantially as
follows (but need not be informed verbatim):
If you refuse to submit to or if you fail to complete and pass evidentiary testing
for alcohol or other intoxicating substances:
(a) The peace officer will seize your driver's license and issue a notice of
suspension and a temporary driving permit to you, but no peace officer will issue
you a temporary driving permit if your driver's license or permit has already been
and is suspended or revoked. No peace officer shall issue a temporary driving
permit to a driver of a commercial vehicle who refuses to submit to or fails to
complete and pass an evidentiary test;
(b) You have the right to request a hearing within seven (7) days of the notice of
suspension of your driver's license to show cause why you refused to submit to or
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to complete and pass evidentiary testing and why your driver's license should not
be suspended;
(c) If you refused or failed to complete evidentiary testing and do not request a
hearing before the court or do not prevail at the hearing, your driver's license will
be suspended. The suspension will be for one (1) year if this is your first refusal.
The suspension will be for two (2) years if this is your second refusal within ten
(10) years. You will not be able to obtain a temporary restricted license during
that period;
(d) If you complete evidentiary testing and fail the testing and do not request a
hearing before the department or do not prevail at the hearing, your driver's
license will be suspended. This suspension will be for ninety (90) days if this is
your first failure of evidentiary testing, but you may request restricted
noncommercial vehicle driving privileges after the first thirty (30) days. The
suspension will be for one (1) year if this is your second failure of evidentiary
testing within five (5) years. You will not be able to obtain a temporary restricted
license during that period;
(e) If you become enrolled in and are a participant in good standing in a drug
court approved by the supreme court drug court and mental health court
coordinating committee under the provisions of chapter 56, title 19, Idaho Code,
you shall be eligible for restricted noncommercial driving privileges for the
purpose of getting to and from work, school or an alcohol treatment program,
which may be granted by the presiding judge of the drug court, provided that you
have served a period of absolute suspension of driving privileges of at least fortyfive (45) days, that an ignition interlock device is installed on each of the motor
vehicles owned or operated, or both, by you and that you have shown proof of
financial responsibility; and
(f) After submitting to evidentiary testing you may, when practicable, at your own
expense, have additional tests made by a person of your own choosing.

On December 3, 2009 Peck was served with a "Suspension Advisory" provides in
pertinent part:
3. If you take and fail the evidentiary testes) pursuant to Section 18-8002,
Idaho Code:
A. Your Idaho driver's license ... will be seized if you have it in your
possession, and if it is current you will be issued a temporary permit. .. .If you
were driving a commercial vehicle, any temporary permit issued will not provide
commercial driving privileges of any kind.
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B. I will serve you with this NOTICE OF SUSPENSION that becomes
effective thirty days from the date of service on this NOTICE, suspending your
driver's license or privileges .... You may request restricted privileges for the
remaining 60 days of the suspension. Restricted driving privileges will not allow
you to operate a commercial motor vehicle ....
Agency Record, page 1.
Idaho law does not require that a driver be informed of every single consequence
of the failure of an evidentiary test. Specifically, Idaho Code Sections 18-8002 and 188002A does not require law enforcement officers to inform drivers of every potential
consequence of failing the evidentiary test. For example, Idaho Code Sections 18-8002
and 18-8002A does not require an officer to inform a driver of all potential charges that
may be filed upon the driver's failure to the evidentiary testing. Although a one year
suspension of a CDL is another consequence of both the refusal to submit to the testing
and the failure of the testing, it is not a potential consequence of which a driver must be
informed at the time of his arrest.

Therefore, the failure to inform Peck of the

consequences to his CDL is not necessary and the Notice of Suspension given to Peck
complied with Idaho law.
VI. THE AFFIDAVIT AND TESTS RESULTS ARE ADEQUATE.
Peck argues that the evidence submitted by the defective because the documents
fail to allege that the acts occurred in the State of Idaho. The hearing officer rejected this
argument finding the Exhibit 4 demonstrated that the alleged acts occurred in Idaho.
Apparently, Petitioner's argument is that the hearing officer's conclusion that the relevant
events occurred in Idaho was "not supported by substantial evidence in the record."
Petitioner's argument is without merit.
The Probably Cause Affidavit submitted by Officer Crossley contains the
following heading:

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER
THE STATE OF IDAHO
Plaintiff
PECK, Raymond S.

)
)
)
)

COURT CASE NUMBER
PROBABLE CAUSE AFFIDAVIT
IN SUPPORT OF ARREST
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* **

State of Idaho,
County of Bonner
See Agency Record, page 5.

Based upon the evidence in the file, including the above

Affidavit, the hearing officer had substantial evidence to conclude that the incident at
issue occurred in Idaho.

VII.

PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE STOP

One of the grounds by with a hearing officer can vacate the ALS suspension is if
the hearing officer finds that ''the peace officer did not have legal cause to stop the
person." Peck argues that the hearing officer's finding that there was legal cause for the
stop was not supported by the evidence. Apparently, Peck's argument is that there
insufficient proof that the speed limit was 35 mph. This argument is without merit.
The officer testified that there was a posted speed limit of 35 mph. The Probable
Cause Affidavit submitted by the officer contained the following:
On December 02, 2009 at approximately 2300 hours, I was parked conducting
Stationary Speed Enforcement along the southbound shoulder of Highway 95
across from the North Info Center. I observed a single vehicle traveling
Southbound towards me that I visually estimated to be doing 45 MPH. As this
stretch of Highway is posted at 35MPH... [emphasis added].
Agency Record, page 6. At the hearing, Peck admitted that he was traveling 45 mph

when he first noticed the officer. Transcript, page 5, lines 10-12. Peck did not refute the
evidence that there was a posted speed limit of35 mph. See Transcript, page 1-12.

On the issue of legal cause for the stop, the hearing officer made the following
findings of fact:
1.

Officer Crossley observed the vehicle driven by Peck travel 45 mph in a
posted 35 mph speed zone.

2.

Since Exhibit 4 specifically states a "posted speed limit" of 35 mph, it is
assumed this area of highway met the requirements of Idaho Code Section 49-
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654(2)(a) and/or (b) even though there were no structures or buildings in the
area prior to Peck being stopped.
3.

Further in supporting that the posted speed limit was 35 mph, Exhibit 4
provides Officer Crossley had issued Peck a speeding citation.

4.

Peck's argument regarding the posted speed limit is unsupportive and fails to
meet his burden of proof.

5.

Officer Crossley had legal cause to stop the vehicle driven by Peck.

Agency Record, pages 35-36. Certainly, the findings of the hearing officer are supported

by substantial evidence.
Peck's argument is that there was insufficient proof that the speed limit was 35
mph. This argument ignores the undisputed fact that there was a posted speed limit of
3Smph. The agency's factual determinations are binding on the reviewing court, even
where there is conflicting evidence before the agency, so long as the determinations are
supported by substantial competent evidence in the record. Bennett v. State, Dept. of
Transp., 147 Idaho 141,206 P.3d 505 (Idaho App. 2009); Urrutia v. Blaine County, ex
rei. Bd ofComm'rs, 134 Idaho 353, 357,2 P.3d 738, 742 (2000); Marshall, 137 Idaho at

340,48 P.3d at 669.
Peck's argument appears to be that, even if the posted speed limit was 35 mph,
that evidence does not prove the speed limit because Peck was not in a business district,
residential district or an urban district. This argument also lacks merit.
Idaho's basic rule regarding speed limits is contained at Idaho Code Section 49654. Section 2 of the statute provides:
(2) Where no special hazard or condition exists that requires lower speed for
compliance with subsection (1) of this section the limits as hereinafter authorized
shall be maximum lawful speeds, and no person shall drive a vehicle at a speed in
excess of the maximum limits:
(a) Thirty-five (35) miles per hour or a lesser maximum speed adopted pursuant to
section 49-207(2)(a), Idaho Code, in any residential, business or urban district;
(b) Thirty-five (35) miles per hour in any urban district;
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Residential, business and urban districts are defined. Idaho Code Section 49105 ( 11) defines the term "district" as follows:
(a) Business district. The territory contiguous to and including a highway when
within any six hundred (600) feet along the highway there are buildings in use for
business or industrial purposes, including hotels, banks or office buildings,
railroad stations and public buildings which occupy at least three hundred (300)
feet of frontage on one side or three hundred (300) feet collectively on both sides
of the highway.

(b) Residential district. The territory contiguous to and including a highway not
comprising a business district when the property on the highway for a distance of
three hundred (300) feet or more is in the main improved with residences, or
residences and buildings in use for business.
(c) Urban district. The territory contiguous to and including any highway which is
built up with structures devoted to business, industry or dwelling houses. For
purposes of establishing speed limits in accordance with the provisions of section
49-654, Idaho Code, no state highway or any portion thereof lying within the
boundaries of an urban district is subject to the limitations which otherwise apply
to nonstate highways within an urban district. Provided, this subsection shall
not limit the authority of the duly elected officials of an incorporated city
acting as a local authority to decrease speed limits on state highways passing
through any district within the incorporated city. [emphasis added].
Idaho Code § 49-207 specifically allows cities to enact and enforce general
ordinances prescribing additional requirements for the operation of vehicles upon the
city's highways. State v. Young, 144 Idaho 646, 167 P.3d 783 (Idaho App. 2006).
Idaho Code Section 49-207(b) provides:
(2) Whenever local authorities in their respective jurisdictions, including the duly
elected officials of an incorporated city acting in the capacity of a local authority,
determine on the basis of an engineering or traffic investigation, and the
residential, urban or business character of the neighborhood abutting the highway
in a residential, business or urban district that the speed limit permitted under this
title is greater than is reasonable and safe under the conditions found to exist upon
a highway or part of a highway or because of the residential, urban or business
character of the neighborhood abutting the highway in a residential, business or
urban district, the local authority may determine and declare a reasonable and safe
maximum limit which:
(a) Decreases the limit within a residential, business or urban district; or
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(b) Decreases the limit outside an urban district.
Evidence that Peck was not in a "district" as defined above is not relevant because
the undisputed evidence was that there was a posted speed limit. Even if the area where
the speed limit was posted at 35 mph did not meet the definition of a business district,
residential district or an urban district, a city had statutory authority to place a speed limit
of 35 mph in the area of Highway 95. Therefore, the hearing officer was correct to
conclude that the officer had legal cause to stop Peck for speeding.

VIII. THE HAC TESTS WERE VALID
Petitioner argued that the BAC tests were invalid because Peck was belching
during the observation period. Petitioner's argument is without merit.
The Probable Cause Affidavit from Officer Crossley stated the following:
PECK was transported to the Sandpoint Police Department, where I began the 15
minute monitoring period and read him the ALS suspension advisory in its
entirety, and requested a breath sample which he provided(.089/xxx) after not
obtaining a second reading, the fifteen minutes of observation was started agin
(sic). Following the second observation period, PECK again provided a breath
sample (.083/.086) BrAC.
Agency Record, page 6 (emphasis added). Contrary to this, Peck testified during the ALS
hearing. Peck stated as follows:
Q:
Was then an additionalI5-minute waiting period started?
A:
Yes.
Q:
And during that I5-minute waiting period, at any time did you belch?
A:
Yes.
Q:
And did you have your mouth open at the time of the belch?
A:
Yes.
Q:
And did you also pat or I'll describe it as tap on your chest with your fist
at the time of the belch?
A:
Yes.
Q:
And the officer was present when you did that?
A:
Yes.
Q:
And how much time from the belch until giving what would be the first
sample of the second set of tests, how much time passed?
A:
Oh, I did it right away.
Q:
Less than one minute before taking the first breath test of the second
sample?
A:
Yes.
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Q:
And no additional I5-minute wait period was started after your belch. Is
that correct?
A: No, there was not.
Transcript, page 6-7.
The hearing officer, after reviewing the evidence, disagreed with Peck. In his
findings the hearing officer wrote:
1.

Officer Crossley's affidavit states the evidentiary test was performed
in compliance with Idaho Code and ISP Forensic Services SOPs.

2.

I find it very doubtful that Officer Crossley would have ignored Peck
tapping his chest, opening his mouth, and then belching prior [to]
submitting to a breath sample at 00:48 on December 3, 3009.

3.

Exhibit 3's BrAC results support this conclusion in that Peck's two
subject tests only differed by .003 making the results a valid subject
tests pursuant to ISP Forensic Services SOP Sections 3.2 and 3.2.3
requirements.

4.

Further, this agreement noted in Exhibit 3 's BrAC two tests further
strongly refute the possibility that any mouth alcohol from Peck's

"alleged" belching had skewed Exhibit 3 results before Peck was
administered an evidentiary breath test.
5.

Peck's evidentiary test was performed in compliance with Idaho Code
and ISP Forensic Services SOPs.

Here, the hearing officer had conflicting evidence: the officer's statement that he
conducted two 15 minute observation periods and Peck's testimony that he belched
during the observation period. The hearing officer weighed the conflicting evidence and
concluded that Peck's testimony was not credible. In addition, the hearing officer found
that the consistency of the BrAC results was further evidence that Peck's testimony
regarding the "belch" was incredible.
Petitioner cited Bennett v. State, Dept. ofTransp., 147 Idaho 141,206 P.3d 505
(Idaho App. 2009), to support his argument that the suspension should be vacated. In
Bennett, the petitioner challenged the ALS license suspension contending that she was
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coughing during the 15 minute observation period, during which time, the officer twice
left the room. The court further found that the evidence that the officer left the room was
not specifically controverted by the officer's affidavit. The Court of Appeals held:
Bennett bore the burden to prove grounds to vacate the suspension of her
license. Bennett testified that the officer left the room twice during the
fUteen-minute monitoring period. The hearing officer did not fmd Bennett's
[206 P.3d 509] testimony to lack credibility. This testimony, then, would
demonstrate that proper monitoring procedures were not followed, and that the
test for alcohol concentration was, therefore, not conducted in accordance with
the requirements ofl.C. § 18-8004(4). The State presented only the officer's
probable cause affidavit. The officer's form affidavit provides only generalized
statements regarding employment of proper procedures. However, when specific,
credible evidence demonstrates a violation of proper procedures, the affidavit
alone is insufficient to support a finding that proper procedures were followed.
Thus, the hearing officer's finding that the breath test was conducted in
compliance with procedural standards is not supported by substantial evidence in
the record as a whole. Therefore, the district court did not err in vacating the
hearing officer's decision.
Id., at pages 508-509.

This case is factually distinguishable from the Bennett case. Here, there was no
evidence that the officer left the room or that the officer left Peck unattended during the
15 minute observation period. On the contrary, Peck admits that the officer was present

in the room when Peck allegedly belched. Transcript, page 6, lines 24-25.
Furthermore in Bennett, the only evidence regarding compliance by the officer
with the testing procedures was a computer-generated affidavit which contained a
paragraph above the officer's signature line that read: "The test(s) was/were performed in
compliance with Section 18-8003 & 18-8004(4) Idaho Code and the standards and
methods adopted by the Department of Law Enforcement." Here, Officer Crossley'S
Affidavit contained specific statements about compliance with two fifteen minute
observation periods.
In Bennett case, the hearing officer was presented with unrefuted testimony that
the officer left the room during the 15 minute observation period. Here, the hearing
officer's was presented with conflicting evidence. Therefore, his role was to weigh
conflicting evidence. Evaluating disputed evidence, the hearing officer made a factual
determination that Peck's testimony was not credible and discounted Peck's testimony
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regarding the alleged belch. This finding is based upon substantial and competent
evidence and is therefore binding on the reviewing court. 2
VIII. ATTORNEY FEES AGAINST lTD ARE NOT JUSTIFIED.
Petitioner is also requesting an award of attorney fees on this appeal.

This

argument is also without merit. Idaho Code Section 12-117(1) provides for an award of
attorney fees only if certain conditions are met. The statute provides:
(1) Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any administrative or civil judicial
proceeding involving as adverse parties a state agency, a city, a county or other
taxing district and a person, the court shall award the prevailing party reasonable
attorney's fees, witness fees and reasonable expenses, if the court finds that the
party against whom the judgment is rendered acted without a reasonable basis in
fact or law.

Therefore, to award attorney fees under this section, the Court must rule in favor
of Peck and also find that the Department acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law.
See, CanallNorcrestlColumbus Action Comm. v. City of Boise, 136 Idaho 666, 671, 39
P.3d 606, 611 (2001).
In this matter, as discussed above, there was a reasonable basis in law and in the
facts upon which the hearing officer made his decision.

Therefore, since neither

requirement of the statute has been met, the court must decline to award attorney fees.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, lTD respectfully requests this Court to affirm the
decision of the hearing officer, vacate the driver's license stay and uphold the suspension
of Peck's driver's license.
Dated June 1,2010.
Susan K. Servick

2The agency's factual detenninations are binding on the reviewing court, even where there is conflicting
evidence before the agency, so long as the detenninations are supported by substantial competent evidence
in the record. Bennett v. State, Dept. ofTransp., 147 Idaho 141,206 P.3d 505 (Idaho App. 2009); Urrutia
v. Blaine County, ex rei. Bd ojComm'rs, 134 Idaho 353,357,2 P.3d 738, 742 (2000); Marshall, 137 Idaho
at 340, 48 P.3d at 669.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER
RAYMOND SCOTT PECK,

)

Case No. CV-2010-0047

)

Petitioner,

)

PETITIONER'S CLOSING BRIEF

)

v.

)
)

STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,

)
)
)

Responden t .

)
)

COMES NOW the Petitioner and files this Petitioner's Closing
Brief, as follows:

I. There Was No Officer Schneider
In the Respondent's Brief, in the section I. Factual And
Procedural Background portion, the Idaho Transportation Department
(herein "ITO") makes a statement that is not supported by the
record.

At the top of page 2 of the Respondent's Brief in the

last sentence of the carry-over paragraph, the ITO asserts that an
"Officer Schneider served Peck .... "

The record does not support
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that an Officer Schneider was involved whatsoever, let alone
served anything upon Mr. Peck.

II. The Bearing Was Not Beld Pursuant To Notice
In the Respondent's Brief, in the section IV. Adequate
Bearing Notice portion, the ITO incorrectly presents the order of
the Notices i t issued.

On December 15, 2009, the ITO first issued

by U.S. Mail its Notice Of Telephonic Hearing CR. p. 20) setting
December 29, 2009-as the hearing date with hearing officer Eric
Moody, and then issued by U.S. Mail its Show Cause Letter CR. p.
21) citing a conflict with Mark Richmond, the hearing officer's
schedule to justify an extension.
On December 18, 2009, the ITO first issued by fax at 2:19
p.m. its Notice of Telephonic Hearing (R. p. 22-23) changing the
date to December 9, 2009 and changing the hearing officer to Eric
Moody, and then issued by fax at 3:40 p.m. its Show Cause Letter
(R. p. 24-25) citing a change of hearing officer.
The ITO attempts to shrug off its hearing notice for December
9, 2009 as an interesting typographical error that "probably
should have read December 29 th . "

The December 18, 2009 Notices

changed both the hearing officer and the hearing date.

There was

not a shown cause letter or assertion to exceed the 20 day hearing
deadline in Idaho Code 18-8002A(7) once the hearing officer was
changed to Eric Moody.

The basis for the December 29 hearing date

was that the hearing officer Mark Richmond had a scheduling
conflict.

There is nothing in the record to support not holding

the hearing as noticed for December 9 nor to exceed the 20 day
period to an unnoticed date of December 29.
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The hearing was not

noticed nor held in compliance with the statutory provisions of
Idaho Code 18-8002A.
The lTD concludes with the assertion that "no substantial
right of the Petitioner was violated," but the standard on review
is whether the lTD complied with the statutory requirements.
Thus, for each of those reasons, the hearing officer's decision
should be vacated.

III. Implied Consent Requires Notice Of The Consequences
The Idaho statutes for alcohol testing in Idaho Code §§ 188002 and 18-8002A are based upon implied consent.

The statutory

fiction of implied consent is conditioned upon notice of the
consequences being given to the driver
testing.

~ediately

prior to the

Without proper notice, the driver has not given implied

consent and the license cannot be suspended.
As explained in Matter of Virgil, 126 Idaho 946, 947, 895
P.2d 182, 183 (Idaho App. 1995), "Idaho law requires strict
adherence to the statutory language ... " which provides notice.
Further, a driver'S license is to be reinstated if the driver is
"not completely advised of his rights and duties."

Matter of

Virgil, 126 Idaho 946, 947, 895 P.2d 182, 183 (Idaho App. 1995)
citing Matter of Griffiths, 113 Idaho 364, 370, 744 P.2d 92, 98
(1987) .
Also, as set forth in Halen v. State, 136 Idaho 829, 833834, 41 P.3d 257, 261 - 262 (Idaho 2002) the warrantless search
exception is based upon the implied consent.

Implied consent

requires notice of one's rights and the consequences.

As no

notice is given of the disqualification provisions of Idaho Code
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§

49-335(2), there is no implied and no infor.med consent.

Thus

the without being infor.med of the statutory provision, the testing
is not upon consent, and violates due process.

Thus the hearing

officer's decision should be vacated on those grounds.

IV. The Affidavit Is Lacking
The Affidavit set forth at Exhibit 4 (R. Pgs. 4-8»

fails to

identify the alleged acts as occurring in the State of Idaho.
The lTD does not dispute that.

The lTD asserts that the

Affidavit sets forth sufficient facts to show jurisdiction since
the heading indicates that it may relate to some filing in a
judicial case in the State of Idaho, County of Bonner, and that
i t was signed by the officer in the State of Idaho, County of
Bonner.

The caption for another proceeding and the location i t

was signed in, do not make up for the factual deficiency that no
state or county are provided for in the recitations of the
alleged events.

If the officer signed in Kootenai County, Idaho

that in and of itself would not be sufficient to assert the
conduct did not occur in Bonner County, Idaho if sufficient facts
were set forth in the Affidavit of acts in Bonner County, Idaho.
In this instance the Affidavit is defective, and the defect
is not cured based upon the caption and the location signed.
This is the same affidavit that indicates in the narrative that
certain tests were not administered, but in the check the box
portion asserts the tests were given and failed.

The Affidavit

lacks credibility to support the alleged facts and/or suspension.
Thus the hearing officer's decision should be vacated on these
grounds.
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VI. Probable Cause Is Lackinq
In the Respondent's Brief, in the section VII. Probable Cause
For The Stop, the lTD asserts in essence that a posted speed 11mit
siqn, without any statutory authority for its postinq, controls
over the statutorily mandated speed limit. It cannot be presumed
or even assumed that a posted speed limit siqn controls what
statutory District exists.

If this were the case, the statute

would provide for all speed limits to be set by postinq, not by
District definition.

The postinq must comply with the District,

as defined by statute.
The Petitioner Peck's arqument can be summarized as follows:
The statutorily defined District sets the applicable speed 11mit.
A speed limit siqn posted contrary to the statute is of no effect.
The postinq is void and ultra vires.

In other words, the siqn

does not control the speed limit; rather the statutory definition
defines the 11mit.

A siqn posted contrary to the law, is of no

effect.
The lTD also attempts to arque that a city can lower the 45
mile per hour speed within the Urban District pursuant to Idaho
Code 49-105(11(c).

In order for this provision to be applicable,

Peck would have had to have been in an Urban District (and proof
of city acting would be necessary).

As irrefutably established by

the evidence, the portion of the highway upon which Peck was
traveling, was NOT in an Urban District.

Therefore, it is

irrelevant if an incorporated city acted or not, because an
incorporated city only has authority to act in the Urban District,
not outside of an Urban District.
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The lTD and its hearing officer cannot "assume" matters not
in the record and contrary to the statutory scheme establishing
speed limits.

Thus, the hearing officer's finding that the

grounds existed for the stop is not supported by substantial
evidence in the record as a whole and the decision should be
vacated.

VII. The BAC Tests Are Invalid
In the Respondent's Brief, in the section VIII. The BAC Tests
Were Valid, the lTD attempts to distinguish the Bennett case and
holding.

In Bennett v. Idaho Dept. of Transportation, 147 Idaho

141, 144-145 (Idaho App. 2009), the officer's affidavit asserted
compliance with the testing procedures (which included that he
was present to observe during the observation period).

In this

circumstance the officer's affidavit likewise asserts compliance
with the testing procedures (which include that he did not
observe any belch).

In Bennett, the specific testimony was that

the officer did observe during the entire observation period.

In

this circumstance, the specific testimony is that the officer did
observe a belch during the observation period.

The facts and the

holding of Bennett fall squarely in line with the pending issue.
The hearing officer did not have any credible specific evidence
from the officer's affidavit that Peck did not belch.

The

hearing officer did not find Peck to not be credible.
Peck's testimony demonstrates that proper monitoring
procedures were not followed, and that the test for alcohol
concentration was, therefore, not conducted in accordance with
the requirements of I.C. § 18-8004(4).
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conflicting evidence presented by the hearing officer.

Thus, the

hearing officer's finding that the breath test was conducted in
compliance with procedural standards is directly contrary to the
Bennett holding, and is not supported by substantial evidence in
the record as a whole.

The decision should be vacated on these

grounds.

VIII. Conclusion - The Suspension Should Be Vacated
As set forth in the Petitioner's Opening Brief and as set
forth above, the hearing officer's decision sustaining the Notice
of Suspension was in error.

The Notice of Suspension should be

vacated with the Petitioner's driving privileges reinstated, and
for an award to the Petitioner of attorney fees and costs against
the Respondent.

DATED this

of June, 2010.

9·
/;mIdrl·FINNEY-~
A.

E:r.NNEY FINNEY & FINNEY, P.A.
Attorney for Petitioner

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
~
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was served by U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, this ~
day of June, 2010, and was addressed to:

Susan K. Servick
Special Deputy Attorney General
618 North 4~ Street
P.O. Box 2900
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816
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STATE OF IDAHO
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER
RAYMOND SCOTT PECK,

)
)

Petitioner,

)
)
)

v.

STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT
OF TRANSPORTATION,

)

CASE NO. CV-2010-0000047

)
)
)

DECISION ON APPEAL

)
)
)

Respondent.

)
)

Raymond Scott Peck filed a Petition for Judicial Review of the
administrative suspension of his driver's license. No substantial rights of Mr.
Peck were prejudiced. Substantial evidence in the record supports the hearing
officer's findings. The agency's decision is affirmed.

I. INTRODUCTION
This case stems from Respondent State of Idaho, Department of Transportation's
(hereafter, "Department") suspension of Petitioner Raymond Scott Peck's driving privileges. On
January 14, 2010, Mr. Peck filed a Petition for Judicial Review of the Department's
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administrative suspension of his license. The parties filed appellate briefs, and the matter came
before the Court for oral argument on September 8, 2010.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Statement of Facts
On December 2,2009, Mr. Peck was arrested for Driving Under the Influence (DUI) by
Sandpoint Police Officer Nolan Crossley in Bonner County, Idaho.

Officer Crossley was

conducting stationary speed enforcement on Highway 95 across from the North Information
Center. He observed a vehicle traveling 45 mph in a 35 mph posted speed zone. He contacted
the driver, who was identified as Raymond Peck. The officer detected an odor of alcohol. Mr.
Peck refused to perform field sobriety tests. He was arrested and transported to the Sandpoint
Police Department. Mr. Peck was then given an evidentiary breath (or blood alcohol content
(BAC)) test and his results were .089/xx and .083/.086. Officer Crossley served Peck with a
Notice of Suspension and issued a permit for temporary driving privileges.
Peck requested an administrative hearing on the proposed license suspension.

The

hearing was held on December 29, 2009, before Hearing Officer Eric G. Moody. On January 8,
2010, the hearing officer issued "Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order," in which
he sustained the suspension of Mr. Peck's license.
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III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. Statutory Standard of Review of Administrative Agency Decision
In Idaho Code § 67-5279, the legislature outlined the role of the Court in reviewing an
agency decision as follows:
(1) The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to
the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.
(3) When the agency was required by the provisions of this chapter or by
other provisions of law to issue an order, the court shall affirm the agency action
unless the court finds that the agency's findings, inferences, conclusions, or
decisions are:
(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(c) made upon unlawful procedure;
(d) not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or
(e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.
If the agency action is not affirmed, it shall be set aside, in whole or in
part, and remanded for further proceedings as necessary.
(4) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (2) and (3) of this
section, agency action shall be affirmed unless substantial rights of the
appellant have been prejudiced.

I.e. § 67-5279(1), (3)-(4).

(Emphasis supplied).

B. Appellate Standard of Review of Administrative License Suspension
The Idaho Court of Appeals, in the Matter

0/ the Suspension 0/ the

Driver's License of

Marvin Gibbar, State 0/ Idaho, Department o/Transportation v. Marvin Gibbar, 143 Idaho 937,
155 P.3d 1176, (Ct. App. 2006), states:
The Idaho Administrative Procedures Act (IDAP A) governs the review of
department decisions to deny, cancel, suspend, disqualify, revoke or restrict a
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person's driver's license. See I.C. §§ 49-201, 49-330, 67-5201(2), 67-5270. In an
appeal from the decision of the district court acting in its appellate capacity under
IDAPA, this Court reviews the agency record independently of the district court's
decision. Marshall v. Idaho Dep't of Transp., 137 Idaho 337, 340, 48 P.3d 666,
669 (Ct. App. 2002). This Court does not substitute its judgment for that of
the agency as to the weight of the evidence presented. I.C. § 67-5279(1);
Marshall, 137 Idaho at 340, 48 P.3d at 669. This Court instead defers to the
agency's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Castaneda v.
Brighton Corp., 130 Idaho 923, 926, 950 P.2d 1262, 1265 (1998); Marshall, 137
Idaho at 340, 48 P.3d at 669.
In other words, the agency's factual
determinations are binding on the reviewing court, even where there is
conflicting evidence before the agency, so long as the determinations are
supported by substantial competent evidence in the record. Urrutia v. Blaine
County, ex reI. Bd Of Comm 's, 134 Idaho 353, 357, 2 P.3d 738, 742 (2000);
Marshall, 137 Idaho at 340, 48 P.3d at 669.
A court may overturn an agency's decision where its findings, inferences,
conclusions, or decisions: (a) violate statutory or constitutional provisions; (b)
exceed the agency's statutory authority; (c) are made upon unlawful procedure;
(d) are not supported by substantial evidence in the record; or (e) are arbitrary,
capricious, or an abuse of discretion. I.C. § 67-5279(3). The party challenging
the agency decision must demonstrate that the agency erred in a manner
specified in I.e. § 67-5279(3) and that a substantial right of that party has
been prejudiced. Price v. Payette County Bd Of County Comm'rs, 131 Idaho
426, 429, 958 P.2d 583, 586 (1998); Marshall, 137 Idaho at 340, 48 P.3d at 669.
If the agency's decision is not affirmed on appeal, "it shall be set aside ... and
remanded for further proceedings as necessary." I.C. § 67-5279(3).

Id. at 941-942, 155 P.3d at 1180-1181. (Emphasis supplied).

IV. THE PARTIES' ARGUMENTS
A. Raymond Peck's Arguments
On appeal, Mr. Peck presents the following arguments:
1. Improper Hearing Notice
The Notice of Telephonic Hearing and Show Cause Letter, each dated December 15,
2009, provided for Hearing Officer Mark Richmond and a hearing date of December 29, 2009.
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(R. at 20-21) The Notice of Telephonic Hearing and Show Cause Letter, each dated December

18, 2009, provided for the hearing to be December 9, 2009, before Hearing Officer Eric Moody.
(R. at 22-25). The hearing was not conducted pursuant to the noticed date of December 9, 2009,

nor in compliance with the statutory provisions of Idaho Code § 18-8002A.
2. Lack of Notice, Violation of Due Process
The Notice of Suspension Form (R. at 1-2, Exhibit 1) fails to satisfy the notice
requirements of the Idaho Code and due process, as it fails to give notice of the provisions of
Idaho Code § 49-335(2), which provides that:
Any person who operates a commercial motor vehicle or who holds a class A, B
or C driver's license is disqualified from operating a commercial motor vehicle for
a period of not less than one (1) year if the person refuses to submit to or submits
to and fails a test to determine the driver's alcohol, drug or other intoxicating
substances concentration while operating a motor vehicle.
There is no implied and no informed consent as it relates to the punitive
"disqualification" and the testing without consent violates due process.
3. The Affidavit and Test Results are Lacking
The Probable Cause Affidavit and test results used to sustain the suspension (R. at
3-8, Exhibits 2, 3, and 4) are defective in that they: (I) fail to identify the alleged acts as
occurring in the State of Idaho; (2) indicate Sim. Check No. 0008 and 0009 having
variations of .005; (3) and show the officer stating matters in the narrative, contrary to the
"check the box" portion of the affidavit. Taken as a whole, the credibility of the affidavit
is in question because the statements made in the affidavit are contradictory.
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4. No Grounds for Stop
The Probable Cause Affidavit used to sustain the suspension (R. at 5-8, Exhibit 4)
and the traffic citation assert the basis for the stop as traveling 45 mph in a posted 35 mph
zone, with visual estimation and radar indicating 45 mph, in violation of Idaho Code §
49-654(2).
There is no testimony or evidence in the record by the officer other than the
general assertion of a posted speed limit of 35 mph. There is no factual statement of any
specific sign or posting of a speed limit. There is no testimony or evidence in the record
by the officer, or otherwise, as to the speed zone, and the uncontroverted testimony of the
Mr. Peck is that there were no buildings or structures occupying the sides of the highway
that would meet the statutory definition of business district, residential district, or urban
district.

Therefore, the speed limit on Highway 200 and US 95 in that location is

controlled by Idaho Code § 49-654(2)(d), which provides for 65 mph.
Thus, the hearing officer's finding that grounds existed for the stop

IS

not

supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole.
5. Invalid HAC Tests
Mr. Peck testified that he belched during the I5-minute monitoring period, less
than a minute before taking the breath test. The monitoring period is required in order to
rule out the possibility that alcohol or other substances have been introduced into the
subject's mouth from the outside or by belching or regurgitation.

DECISION ON APPEAL - 6 -

G68

Only the officer's Probable Cause Affidavit was submitted to the Record in
support of the suspension.
statements regarding

The officer's "form" affidavit provides only generalized

employment of proper procedures.

Mr.

Peck presented

uncontroverted specific facts of the belch.
6. Attorney's Fees and Costs
Mr. Peck is entitled to recover attorney's fees against the Department under Idaho
Code § 12-117. Section 12-117 is not a discretionary statute. It provides that the court
shall award attorney's fees upon a finding that the state agency did not act with a
reasonable basis in fact or law.

B. The Department's Arguments
In response to Mr. Peck's contentions, the Department makes the following arguments:
1. Adequate Hearing Notice
The Agency Record reveals the following:
(i)

December 8, 2009, letter from attorney John Finney requesting a hearing on the ALS
suspension. The letter was sent via fax, and therefore, the hearing officer assumes it
was received by the Department on December 8, 2009. (R. at 12-13).

(ii)

December 15,2009, letter from the Department with a Notice of Telephonic Hearing
to be held on December 29,2009, with Hearing Officer Mark Richmond. (R. at 20).

(iii)

December 15, 2009, letter from the Department with a Show Cause Letter with notice
that the hearing date was extended due to a conflict in the hearing examiner's
schedule. (R. at 21).
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(iv)

December 18,2009, letter from the Department with a Notice of Telephonic Hearing
to be held on December 9, 2009, with Hearing Officer Eric Moody. (R. at 22).

The December 18,2009, letter from the Department must contain a typographical error, since the
Notice contains a hearing date of December 9th that precedes the date of the letter (December
18th). This Notice probably should have read December 29 th , not December 9th •
The hearing was held on December 29th before Hearing Officer Eric Moody.

The

December 29th hearing date was within the time allowable by Idaho Code § 18-8002A(7), that is,
twenty (20) days from the date the hearing request was received by the Department, plus the
extension by the hearing officer. There was also no confusion on the part of Mr. Peck regarding
the date of the hearing. Therefore, no substantial right of Mr. Peck was violated.
2. The Notice of Suspension Provides Adequate Notice
Idaho law does not require that a driver be informed of every single consequence of the
failure of an evidentiary test. Specifically, Idaho Code §§ 18-8002 and 18-8002A do not require
that law enforcement officers inform drivers of every potential consequence of failing the
evidentiary test. Although a one-year suspension of a commercial driver's license is another
consequence of both the refusal to submit to the testing and the failure of the test, it is not a
potential consequence of which a driver must be informed at the time of his arrest.
3. The Affidavit and Test Results are Adequate
Based upon the evidence in the file, including the heading of the Probable Cause
Affidavit (R. at 5), showing that that the case is being brought in district court in the "State of
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Idaho, in and for the County of Bonner," the hearing officer had substantial evidence to conclude
that the driving occurred in Idaho.
4. Probable Cause for the Stop
The Probable Cause Affidavit submitted by the officer stated that "this stretch of
Highway is posted at 35 mph ... " (R. at 6). At the hearing, Mr. Peck admitted that he was
traveling 45 mph when he first noticed the officer. (Transcript at 5, lines 10-12). Peck did not
refute the evidence that there was a posted speed limit of 35 mph. (Transcript at 1-2).
5. The BAC Tests Were Valid
The hearing officer had conflicting evidence: the officer's statement in the Probable
Cause Affidavit that he conducted two 15-minute observation periods, and Mr. Peck's testimony
that he belched during the observation period. The hearing officer weighed the conflicting
evidence and concluded that Mr. Peck's testimony was not credible. In addition, the hearing
officer found that the consistency of the BAC results was further evidence that Mr. Peck's
testimony regarding the belch was not credible.
6. Attorney's Fees Against the Department are Not Justified
To award attorney's fees under Idaho Code § 12-117, the Court must rule in favor of Mr.
Peck and also find that the Department acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law.
In this case, as discussed above, there was a reasonable basis, both in law and in fact,
upon which the hearing officer made his decision.
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V. ANALYSIS
A. The Substantial Rights Of Mr. Peck Were Not Prejudiced
Mr. Peck argues that the agency decision should be set aside because the hearing was not
conducted pursuant to the noticed date of December 9, 2009, which was set forth in the
December 18, 2009, Notice of Telephonic Hearing. The Department claims that the December
18,2009, Notice contained a typographical error; it should have read December 29, 2009, which
was the hearing date set forth in the Department's earlier Notice. According to the Department,
there was no confusion on the part of Mr. Peck regarding the date of the hearing.
Mr. Peck also asserts that the agency decision should be set aside because the arresting
officer failed to give Mr. Peck notice of the provisions of I.e. § 49-335(2). Specifically, Mr.
Peck contends that he should have been informed that he could be disqualified from operating a
commercial motor vehicle for one year for refusing to submit to, or by failing a BAC test. The
Department states that the one-year suspension of a commercial driver's license is just another
consequence of the refusal to submit to, or the failure of the test, but it is not a potential
consequence which a driver must be informed of at the time of his arrest.
Pursuant to I.C. § 67-5279(4), the "agency action shall be affirmed unless substantial
rights of the appellant have been prejudiced." In this case, the hearing was held on December
29,2009. Mr. Peck was represented at the hearing by his attorney, John Finney. Simply stated,
the listing of an already passed date as being the date of the hearing did not affect any
"substantial right" of Mr. Peck, as he did attend the hearing and the issues he raised were
addressed.
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In regard to the fact that Mr. Peck was not informed of the consequence of either not
taking the test or failing the test, the result of either choice in this case would have been the
same, that is, a one-year suspension ofMr. Peck's license.
As can be seen by the facts presented, no substantial right of Mr. Peck was prejudiced
either by the typographical error in the December 18,2009, Notice of Hearing or by the officer's
failure to inform Mr. Peck of the potential one-year commercial driver's license suspension.

B. Mr. Peck Failed To Satisfy His Burden Of Proof Under I.C. § 49-654(2)
Idaho Code § 49-654 provides, in pertinent part:
(2) Where no special hazard or condition exists that requires lower speed for
compliance with subsection (l) of this section the limits as hereinafter authorized
shall be maximum lawful speeds, and no person shall drive a vehicle at a speed in
excess of the maximum limits:
(a) Thirty-five (35) miles per hour or a lesser maximum speed adopted pursuant to
section 49-207(2)(a), Idaho Code, in any residential, business or urban district;
(d) Sixty-five (65) miles per hour on state highways; ...

I.e. § 49-654(2)(a), (d).

(Emphasis supplied).

Mr. Peck maintains that the agency decision should be set aside because there
were no buildings or structures occupying the sides of the highway that would meet the
statutory definition of a business district, residential district, or urban district set forth in

I.e.

§ 49-654(2)(a), and therefore, the speed limit on Highway 200 and US 95 in the

location where the alleged act occurred is 65 mph, pursuant to I.e. § 49-654(2)(d).
In order to prevail, however, Mr. Peck must show that "no special hazard or
condition exists that requires lower speed." No testimony was presented to negate this
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preconditions to the applicability of I.C. § 49-654(2).

Without establishing the

preconditions that no special hazard and that no special condition existed, the Court is
constrained to conclude that Mr. Peck did not meet his burden of proof at the time of the
hearing or on appeal.

C. The Department's Factual Determinations Are Supported By Substantial Evidence
Mr. Peck raises several issues concerning the Probable Cause Affidavit and the BAC test
results used to sustain the suspension, including the failure of the affidavit to identify the alleged
act as occurring in the State of Idaho, and Mr. Peck's testimony that he belched during the 15minute monitoring period, less than a minute before taking the breath test.
In the Matter of the Suspension of the Driver's License of Marvin Gibbar, State of Idaho,
Department of Transportation v. Marvin Gibbar, the Idaho Court of Appeals states:

[T]he agency's factual determinations are binding on the reviewing court, even
where there is conflicting evidence before the agency, so long as the
determinations are supported by substantial competent evidence in the record.
143 Idaho 937,941,55 P.3d 1180 (Ct. App. 2006).
In this case there is substantial evidence in the record to conclude that the alleged act occurred in
Idaho. Although the affidavit is contradictory and there was conflicting evidence regarding the
belch, the hearing officer weighed the conflicting evidence and found the officer's testimony to
be more credible. The hearing officer's evaluation of the parties' credibility, and his conclusion
that Mr. Peck's testimony concerning the belch should not be accepted, could have been based in
part on the similarly of the breath test results. It would be inappropriate for a reviewing court to
second guess the hearing officer's findings of fact under these circumstances. The agency's
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findings must be upheld, as they are not clearly erroneous and are supported by substantial
evidence in the record.
D. No Attorney's Fees Are Awarded
Idaho Code § 12-117 provides, in pertinent part:
(1) Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any administrative proceeding or civil
judicial proceeding involving as adverse parties a state agency or political
subdivision and a person, the state agency or political subdivision or the court, as
the case may be, shall award the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees,
witness fees and other reasonable expenses, if it finds that the non prevailing
party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law.

1. C. § 12-117(1). (Emphasis supplied).

Mr. Peck is not the prevailing party and he did not establish that the Department acted
without a reasonable basis in fact or law. No attorney's fees are awarded.
VI. CONCLUSION
NOW, THEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the State of Idaho, Department of
Transportation's decision to suspend the driver's license of Raymond Scott Peck is affirmed.

DATED this

Z~y of September, 2010.

=~~
District Judge
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER
RAYMOND SCOTT PECK,

)

Case No. CV-2010-0047

)

Petitioner,

)
)

v.

)

PETITION FOR REHEARING AND/OR
MOTION TO RECONSIDER AND/OR,
MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND

)

STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,
Respondent.

)
)

and

)

NOTICE OF HEARING

)
)

COMES NON the Petitioner by and through counsel JOHN A.
FINNEY of FINNEY FINNEY & FINNEY, P.A., and pursuant to IRCP 84,
11, 59, and/or IAR 42, petitions for the Court to rehear and/or
moves for the Court to reconsider, and/or alter or amend, its
findings and conclusions in the Decision On Appeal entered
September 28, 2010.

The Petitioner seeks to address the Court's

analysis on three matters in the Decision On Appeal.
1.

Necessa;r Advice Was Lacking

First, the Court did not address the Petitioner's due process
rights as related to informed or implied consent.
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The Court

appears to decide based upon two points:

That whatever the result

of the testing, the consequence is same specific and predetermined outcome; and/or, that no substantial right of Mr. Peck
is prejudiced.
The Court failed to recognize (or at a minimum consider) that
evidentiary testing for blood alcohol is a seizure of the person
and a search for evidence.

Pursuant to the Fourth Amendment to

the United States Constitution, Mr. Peck has a substantial right
to be free of search or seizure.
136 Idaho 697 (2001).

State v. Cooper, 39 P.3d 637,

In order to have a search and seizure, a

driver's informed or implied consent must be based upon an
accurate advice of the consequences.

Here there is no advice

given prior to the request for testing that a person's COL
privileges are impacted differently than the other driving
privileges in the advisory (one year as opposed to 90 days).
such there is not sufficient advice.

As

The legal rational and

analysis is the same as if the consequences of the "standard"
advisory form were not read to the driver.

The outcome is the

same on the advisory for.m's advice whether given or not: take the
test and fail OR refuse the test and the driver faces the same
suspension result.

The appellate decisions of Idaho have not

concluded that since the result is the same either way, that no
advice is necessary.

The case law is exactly the opposite.

The

appellate decisions require the advice to be given to the driver
to "validate" the implied or informed consent.
The Court is respectfully requested to reconsider the
Decision On Appeal as to this issue, and to conclude that the lack
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of advice of the CDL suspension requires that Mr. Peck's driving
privi1eges be reinstated.

Matter of Virgi1, 126 Idaho 946, 895

P.2d 182 (Idaho App. 1995);

Matter of Griffiths, 113 Idaho 364,

744 P.2d 92 (1987).
2.

The Basic Ru1e Of I.C. § 49-654 Was Not Invoked

Second, the Court's ana1ysis of Idaho Code § 49-654(2) is in
error.

The Court appears to have concluded that a person charged

with violating the

max~um 1~its

set in Idaho Code § 49-654(2),

must meet a "precondition" that there are no specia1 hazards or
conditions requiring a 10wer speed

l~it.

The language relied

upon by the Court is not a precondition, but rather statutory
clarification that it is not a defense to the "basic ru1e" to be
driving at or less than the

"max~um

speed

l~it."

A brief history of the statutory provisions of Idaho Code §
49-654 shows that when codified at § 49-701, the "basic ru1e" was
just that:

Paragraph (a) required that a person sha1l not drive

at a speed that is greater than is reasonab1e and prudent.
Paragraph (b) indicated that when a lower speed was not required
by reasonab1eness and prudence, that exceeding certain speeds were
"pr~a

facie" evidence that the speed was not reasonab1e and

prudent.

See generally State v.

118 (1965).

Tr~ing,

89 Idaho 440, 406 P.2d

Exceeding the "prima facie" speed was not contrary to

the statute, or in other words, was not a citable offense in and
of itself.
The present version of the statute for the basic ru1e is set
forth in Idaho Code § 49-654(1) and sti1l provides that a person
is to not exceed a speed that is reasonab1e and prudent (a
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subjective standard).

The revision comes in that rather than

prima facie unreasonable and
set,

max~um

speed

l~ts

~prudent

speeds being statutorily

are set for certain districts and types

of highways in Idaho Code § 49-654(2).
max~um

l~i t

speed

Exceeding the statutory

is a citable offense in and of itself.

While the provisions in Idaho Code § 49-654(2) set
speed

max~um

the provision includes the reference to the basic

l~its,

rule of Idaho Code § 49-654(1) which may require lower speeds in
specific circumstances to be reasonable and prudent.

This is to

address and clarify that it is not a defense to the "basic rule"
to be driving at or less than the

"max~um

speed limit."

To summarize: A person to meet the statutory speed law must
drive the lesser of a "reasonable and prudent" speed or the
max~um

speed as set by statute.

Under that statutory scheme of Idaho Code § 49-654 an officer
when observing a driver, may cite a driver under either the basic
rule of subsection (1) or exceeding the
subsection (2).
max~um

speed

max~um

speed

l~it

When an officer cites a person for exceeding the

l~it

under subsection (2), that does not mean that

a person is necessarily being charged with or actually driving a
speed that is not reasonable and prudent.
The Court misinterpreted the introductory language of
subsection (2) to create some burden of proof to refute an
allegation of the citation (and in this matter the affidavit of
the officer) that does NOT exist.

The Probable Cause Affidavit In

Support Of Arrest (R. p. 5-8) is the only evidence in the record
of the basis for the stop.

Nowhere does the officer assert that
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the basic rule of Idaho Code § 49-654(1) was violated or asserted
to be violated.

Nowhere does the officer make reference to any

reasonable and prudent (or unreasonable and

~rudent)

based upon

any hazards or conditions (special or otherwise) .
There is no burden of proof upon Mr. Peck to refute something
which is not required by the statute and which was not asserted by
the officer in the affidavit.

The language focused upon by the

Court is not a "precondition" and even if it were, i t was not
asserted as the, or even a, basis for the stop.

Under any

analysis, the officer did not assert as grounds for the stop that
the Petitioner was traveling at a speed greater than was
reasonable and prudent, or that any special hazard or condition
existed.
~so,

although the issue was not reached by this Court, the

issue of actual speeds compared to posted speeds is analyzed in
Dabestani v. Bellus, 131 Idaho 542 (1998).

This is an issue

argued previously but not reached by the Court.
The Court is respectfully requested to reconsider the
Decision On Appeal as to this issue, and to conclude that officer
lacked grounds for the stop, and that Mr. Peck's driving
privileges be reinstated.
3.

The Fact Of The Belch Was Uncontroverted

Finally, the Court failed to analyze the holding of Bennett
v. Idaho Dept. of Transportation, 147 Idaho 141, 144-145 (Idaho
App. 2009) regarding the general non-specific affidavit compared
to specific evidence regarding the belch.

The Department's

Hearing Officer's findings and/or conclusions regarding the Belch
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cannot be supported (even in part) by "the similarity of the
breath test results."

That is not evidence to contradict the

specific testimony of the belch.

That is not evidence to

discount or to find Mr. Peck's testimony lacking credibility.
The Court is giving deference to findings and conclusions that
were not made by the Department's Hearing Officer.
The Court is respectfully requested to reconsider the
Decision On Appeal as to this issue, and to conclude that officer
lacked grounds for the stop, and that Mr. Peck's driving
privileges be reinstated.
Conclusion
The Petitioner requests this Court to rehear, and/or to
reconsider, alter or amend, the Decision On Appeal, as set forth
above.

Petitioner requests oral argument and a hearing.

NOTICE OF HEARING
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above, shall come for
hearing before the Honorable Steve Verby, District Judge, on
December 8, 2010 at 10:30 a.m., or as soon thereafter as counsel
may be heard, in a courtroom of the Bonner County Courthouse, 215
South First Avenue, Sandpoint, Idaho 83864.
DATED this

l~~y

of October, 2010.

~~.~

'RNA. FINNE~~
INNEY FINNEY & FINNEY, P.A.
Attorney for Petitioner
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was served by U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, this
day of May, 2010, and was addressed to:
Susan K. Servick
Special Deputy Attorney General
618 North 4~ Street
P.O. Box 2900
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816
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SUSAN K. SERVICK
Special Deputy Attorney General

618 North 4'" Street
PO Box 2900
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816
Phone: (208) 667-1486
Fax: (208) 667-1825
TSBN3443
Attorney for RespondOtltIUuho Dc:pllrtmc:nt of Tnmsponation

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRlCT OF' THE STAIE
OF IDAHO, TN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER
RA YMOND SCOTf PECK,
Petitioner,

CASE NO. CVIO-00047
REPLY TO MOTION TO RECONSIDER

vs.

STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,
Re ondent.
On September 28, 2010, the Court issued its Decision on Appeal affinning the
decision of the hearing officer and upholding the Petitioner's administrative license
suspension. On October. 12, 2010 Petitioner filed a Motion to Reconsider) contending
that the Court did not adequately address all the issues raised in the appeal. The Motion

to Reconsider should be denied for the reasons stated herein.

1. Additional Notice Regarding Plaintiff's CDL Was Not Required
Petitioner argues that the Court did not adequately address his due process
argument regarding the affect of the nUl on Petitioner's eDL. The argument is without
merit.

I

The entire title of the document is "Petitioner for Rehearing and/or Motion to Reconsider and/or Motion

to Alter or Amend."
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This issue was raised by the Petitioner and addressed in ITD's Response Brief.
See pages 6-9. This Court addressed the argument on page 11 of its Decision on Appeal.
This Court held:
In regard to the fact that Mr. Peck was not infonncd of the consequence of either
not taking the test or failing the test, the result of either choice in this casc would
have been the same, that is, a one year suspension of Mr. Peck's license.

Decisjon on Appeal, page 11. Thus, the Court properly rejected Petitioner's argument.

2. Basic Rule ofIC 49-654 Was Thoroughly Addressed.
Petitioner argues that the officer lacks grounds to make the stop because the Court
did not properly analyze the affect of the statute establishing the specd limit. This
argument also lacks merit.
As discussed in lTD's Brief, the hearing officer found that there was a posted
speed limit of 35 mph at the location of the stop. Respondent's Brief, page 11-13. This
Court held that in order H)r Mr. Pcck to prevail, he must show that "no special hazard or
condition exists that requires tower speed." Decision on Appeal, pagc 11. This Court
reviewed this issue and correctly concluded that the Petitioner "did not mcet his burden
of proof at the time of the hearing or on appeal." Decision on Appeal, page 12.

3. Factual Findings Supported by Substantial Evidence
Petitioner argues that there was no evidence to contradict the fact that he belched
prior to his breath test and there was no testimony that his testimony lacked credibility.
This argument has also been thoroughly addressed by the Coun.
Here, the Court reviewed the findings of the hearing officer and this Court
correctly concluded that:
It would be inappropriate for a reviewing court to second guess the hearing
officer's findings of fact under these circumstances. The agency's findings must
be upheld, as they are not clearly erroneous and are supported by substantial
evidence in the record.
Decision on Appeal, pages 12-13.
CONCLUSION
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The arguments raised in the Motion to Reconsider havc been previously raised,
considered and rejected. For the reasons stated above, lTD respectfully requests this
Court to deny the Motion to Reconsider.

Dated December 14,2010.

L~ I<.' Lv,-J,.J
Susan K. Servick

CERTrFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby ccnify that true and correct copies of the REPLY TO MOTTON TO
R.ECONSIDER were tr~nsmitted, December 14, 2010 by the following method, to:
JOHN A. FINNEY
Anonley at Law
120 East Lake Street, Suite 317
Sandpoint,ID 83864
Fax: 208 263-8211

./Fax
US Mail
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER

RAYMOND SCOTT PECK,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT
OF TRANSPORTATION,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO: CV-2010-0000047
ORDER ON PETITION
FOR REHEARING

Idaho Code § 49-207(3) allows local authorities to detennine what the
speed limit should be on arterial highways in municipalities. There has
been no showing by the appellant that the placement of the speed limit
sign in this case was in error. The hearing officer's decision is affinned.

On December 22, 2010, this matter came before the court pursuant to Mr. Peck's
petition for rehearing and reconsideration.

After additional thought and review, the

following decision on the petition/motion is made.
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I. The Weight of Evidence
This Court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of
the evidence presented. I.C. § 67-5279(1); Marshall v. Idaho Dep't of Transp., 137
Idaho, 377,340,48 P.3d 666,669 (Ct. App. 2002). This Court must defer to the agency's
findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Castaneda v. Brighton Corp., 130
Idaho 923, 926, 950 P.2d 1262, 1265 (1998). Thus, the agency's factual determinations
are binding on this court even where there is conflicting evidence before the agency, so
long as the determinations are supported by substantial competent evidence in the record.
Urrutia v. Blaine County, ex reI, Bd Of Cmm 'rs, 134 Idaho 353, 357, 2 P.3d 738, 742
(2000); Marshall, 137 Idaho at 340, 48 P.3d at 669.

II. Due Process
There is no statutory requirement that the officer inform the defendant that his
commercial driver's license will be suspended should a positive test occur or should he
refuse the test. Mr. Peck did not provide authority directly on point establishing that not
advising the person arrested of the consequences of taking or refusing an evidentiary test
to determine the presence of alcohol is a denial of due process of law as guaranteed by the
U.S. and Idaho Constitutions. The cases mentioned by Mr. Peck apply to a specific
statute, Idaho Code § 18-8002(3), which mandates that the person who is asked to provide
the evidentiary test be informed of the statutory provisions related to such testing in
regard to non-commercial driving privileges.

This statute requires that information

explicitly contained in the statute be given to the person being tested. It does not require
that the person being tested be provided with information concerning commercial driving
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privileges. Absent the creation of such a duty by statute or the creation of such a duty by
an appellate court, this court will not require such an obligation under the penumbra of
"due process."
III. The Analysis of Idaho Code § 49-654 Was In Error
Idaho Code § 49-654(1) is the "basic rule" provision and requires the operator to
drive a vehicle in a "reasonable and prudent" manner, regardless of what the posted speed
limit is. When considering the statute in its entirety, it does not require that the person
charged with an offense establish that there were no special hazards or conditions which
existed at the time of the stop as they may relate to the posted speed limit. The Decision
on Appeal is in error in that respect as set forth on pages 11 and 12, and that portion of
the decision on appeal is withdrawn.
IV. Idaho Code § 49-207 Allows a Lesser Speed Limit
Idaho Code § 49-654(2), Basic Rule and Maximum Speed Limits, states:
(2) Where no special hazard or condition exists that requires lower speed
for compliance with subsection (1) of this section the limits as hereinafter
authorized shall be maximum lawful speeds, and no person shall drive a
vehicle at a speed in excess of the maximum limits:
(a) Thirty-five (35) miles per hour or a lesser maximum speed adopted
pursuant to section 49-207(2)(a), Idaho Code, in any residential, business
or urban district;
(b) Thirty-five (35) miles per hour in any urban district;
(c) Seventy-five (75) miles per hour on interstate highways;
(d) Sixty-five (65) miles per hour on state highways;
(e) Fifty-five (55) miles per hour in other locations unless otherwise posted
up to a maximum of sixty-five (65) miles per hour.
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On reconsideration of this issue, the uncontroverted testimony in the record is that
there were no buildings or structures occupying the sides of the highway that would meet
the statutory definition of a business district, residential district, or urban district.
Idaho Code § 49-105D defines what a business district, residential district, and
urban district are.
Idaho Code § 49-1 05D provides, in pertinent part:
(11) "District" means:
(a) Business district. The territory contiguous to and including a highway
when within any six hundred (600) feet along the highway there are
buildings in use for business or industrial purposes, including hotels, banks
or office buildings, railroad stations and public buildings which occupy at
least three hundred (300) feet of frontage on one side or three hundred
(300) feet collectively on both sides of the highway.
(b) Residential district. The territory contiguous to and including a
highway not comprising a business district when the property on the
highway for a distance of three hundred (300) feet or more is in the main
improved with residences, or residences and buildings in use for business.
(c) Urban district. The territory contiguous to and including any highway
which is built up with structures devoted to business, industry or dwelling
houses. For purposes of establishing speed limits in accordance with the
provisions of section 49-654, Idaho Code, no state highway or any portion
thereof lying within the boundaries of an urban district is subject to the
limitations which otherwise apply to nonstate highways within an urban
district. Provided, this subsection shall not limit the authority of the duly
elected officials of an incorporated city acting as a local authority to
decrease speed limits on state highways passing through any district within
the incorporated city.
There was no showing made in the arresting officer's affidavit to rebut the
uncontested testimony of Mr. Peck other than the general assertion that there was a posted
speed limit of thirty-five (35) miles per hour and that Mr. Peck was going forty-five (45)
miles per hour. With these facts in mind, the question becomes, were there enough facts
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for the Administrative Hearing Examiner to conclude that there was a violation of Idaho
Code § 49-654(2), one of the offenses charged, and which formed the basis for the stop?
To conduct this analysis, the first question which must be addressed relates to
which party has the "burden of proof." Pursuant to Idaho Code § 18-8002 A(7), Mr. Peck
has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence the positions he advanced
during the hearing.
Mr. Peck asserts that the thirty-five (35) mile per hour speed limit sign could not
be posted because there was nothing to show that the area was either an urban, residential,
or business district. Therefore, according to Mr. Peck, the default provisions of Idaho
Code § 49-654 came into play and the speed limit would be sixty-five miles per hour as
the area where he was driving was on a state highway. What Mr. Peck fails to consider,
however, are the provisions of Idaho Code § 49-207(3). It provides:

(3) Local authorities in their respective jurisdictions shall determine by
an engineering or traffic investigation the proper maximum speed not
exceeding a maximum limit of sixty-five (65) miles per hour for all
arterial highways and shall declare a reasonable and safe maximum
limit which may be greater or less than the limit permitted under this title
for an urban district.
(Emphasis supplied)
With the officer's affidavit showing that the posted speed limit was thirty-five
(35) miles per hour, it was incumbent on Mr. Peck, as he had the burden of proof, to
establish that there was, in the words of Idaho Code Section § 49-207, no "engineering or
traffic investigation" which took place in regard to establishing the speed limit on this
"arterial" highway. This fact was not established by Mr. Peck. Therefore, the hearings
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examiner was correct in reaching the conclusion that Officer Crossley did have legal
cause to stop the vehicle Mr. Peck was driving.
V. The Hearing Officer's Decision Is Based on Mr. Peck's Reduced Credibility
In examining the tenor of the hearing officer's decision involving credibility, he
tactfully implies that Mr. Peck's credibility is in question. A careful review of the record
demonstrates:
1. Mr. Peck refused to perform the field sobriety tests that were offered.
2. Mr. Peck's testimony that he was not asked to perform field sobriety
tests is inaccurate.
3. The breath alcohol content (BACs) results show that Mr. Peck blew a
.083 and a .086 on the two tests.
4. The I.S.P. Forensic Services Standard Operating Procedure Manual
indicates that with only a .003 difference between the two tests, the
conclusion reached that they were valid tests is increased.
5. The close proximity of the two results also refutes the possibility that
any mouth alcohol resulting from an "alleged" belch was improperly
measured.
The hearing officer places in quotation marks, in bold, and then underlines the
term "alleged" (in reference to the testimony as to belching) in his decision, as is done
here.
In Bennett v. State Department of Transportation, 147 Idaho 141, 206 P.3d 505
(Ct. App 2009), the circumstances were different than those presented in this case. In
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Bennett, there was no issue regarding Ms. Bennett's credibility. Here, there is a question

concerning Mr. Peck's credibility from the hearing officer's perspective. In Bennett, the
court stated:
In Carson. l33 Idaho at 453, 988 P.2d at 227, we noted that the
monitoring period is required in order to rule out the possibility that
alcohol or other substances have been introduced into the subject's mouth
from the outside or by belching or regurgitation. The level of surveillance
must be such as could reasonably be expected to accomplish the purpose
of the requirement. In light of the purposes of the requirement,
"observation" can include not only visual observation but use of other
senses as well. So long as the officer is continually in position to use his
senses, not just sight, to determine that the defendant did not belch, burp or
vomit during the observation period, the observation complies with the
training manual instructions. In this regard, the officer need not "stare
fixedly" at the subject for the entire observation period. State v. Remsburg.
126 Idaho 338, 340-41, 882 P.2d 993, 995-96 (Ct.App.l994). The fifteenminute monitoring period is not an onerous burden and "[t]his
foundational standard ordinarily will be met if the officer stays in close
physical proximity to the test subject so that the officer's senses of sight,
smell and hearing can be employed." DeFranco. 143 Idaho at 338, 144
P.3d at 43. In State v. Utz, 125 Idaho 127, 128-29,867 P.2d 1001, 1002-03
(Ct.App.1993), we held that an officer who left the area in which the
subject was being detained had not adequately observed the subject for the
requisite time period. Therefore, to the extent the evidence demonstrates
that the officer left the monitoring room and, as such, could not employ his
senses to monitor Bennett, proper procedures were not followed.
Id. at 144,206 P.3d at 508.
On reconsideration, Mr. Peck argues that the holding of the Bennett case is that an
officer's "form affidavit" which provides only "generalized statements regarding
employment of proper procedures" is insufficient if countered by the credible
uncontroverted testimony of the person who is arrested. In Bennett, however, the officer
left the room and there was no question concerning Ms. Bennett's credibility.
In this case the hearing officer expressly and impliedly questions Mr. Peck's
credibility. His credibility is unquestionably controverted when the hearing officer finds
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that Mr. Peck's testimony concerning the field sobriety tests is not accurate. (Record, p.
50). Mr. Peck's reduced credibility can be inferred by the use of quotation marks, the
underlining, the use of bold type, and the term "alleged" by the hearing officer. (Record,
p. 50). Mr. Peck's credibility is also impliedly questioned by the hearing officer's finding
that the test result differences of only .003 similarly are evidence that the testing was
valid. (Record p. 50). The credibility of Mr. Peck is also placed in doubt when the
hearing officer found it "very doubtful that Officer Crossley would have ignored Peck
tapping his chest, open his mouth, and then belching prior (sic) submitting to a breath
sample at 00:48 on December 3,2009." (Record p. 51).
In Mr. Peck's case, it appears that the hearing officer does not find Mr. Peck to be
credible. Therefore, the holding of Bennett is inapplicable.
VI. Conclusion
In this appeal and at the hearing, Raymond Peck has the burden of proof. Under
the facts presented and the current state of the law, Mr. Peck's license suspension is
affirmed.
DATED this

Z8..fh- day of December, 2010.

District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoi.~$ sent by U.S. mail,
postage prepaid, faxed, or delivered by interoffice mail, this ';"F day of December,
2010, to:
John A. Finney
Finney, Finney & Finney, PA
Attorneys at Law
120 East Lake Street, Suite 317
Sandpoint,ID 83864
Susan K. Servick
Special Deputy Attorney General
P.O. Box 2900
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816

Deputy Clerk
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JOHN A. FiNNEY
FiNNEY FiNNEY & FiNNEY, P.A.
Attorneys at Law
120 East Lake Street, Suite 317
Sandpoint, idaho 83864
Phone:
208-263-7712
Fax:
208-263-8211
iSB Nos. 5413

20n fEB - 1 P 2_.· 3"l.~

iN THE DiSTRiCT COURT OF THE FiRST JUDiCiAL DiSTRiCT OF THE
STATE OF iDAHO, iN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER
RAYMOND SCOTT PECK,
Appellant/Petitioner,

v.
STATE OF iDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATiON,
Respondent/Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2010-0047
NOTiCE OF APPEAL
i.A.R. 17
Category: L.4.
Fee:
$101.00

------------------------------- )
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT STATE OF iDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATiON, THE PARTY'S ATTORNEY SUSAN K. SERViCK, AND THE
CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTiTLED COURT.
NOTiCE
1.

is

HEREBY GiVEN THAT:

The above named Appellant RAYMOND SCOTT PECK appeals

against the above named Respondent STATE OF iDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATiON, to the idaho Supreme Court from the Decision On
Appeal, entered in the above entitled action on September 28,
2010 and the Order On Petition For Rehearing, entered in the
above entitled action on December 28, 2010, the Honorable Steve
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Verby, District Judge, presiding.
2.

That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho

Supreme Court, and the decisions or orders described in paragraph
1 above are appealable orders under and pursuant to Rule 11(f) ,
I.A.R.
3.

A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which

the Appellant intends to assert in the appeal; provided, any such
list of issues on appeal shall not prevent the Appellant from
asserting other issues on appeal, include:
(a>

Was the Petitioner fully infor.med of the

consequences of testing conforming to due process?

4.

(b)

Did grounds for the stop exist?

(c)

Were the BAC test results valid?

Has an order been entered sealing all or any portion of

the record? NO.
5.

If so, what portion? N/A.

(a)

Is a reporter's transcript requested?

(b)

The appellant requests the preparation of the

YES.

following portions of the reporter's transcript in BOTH hard copy
and electronic format:

The reporter's standard transcript as

defined in Rule 25(c), I.A.R., specifically including but not
l~ited

6.

to argument on September 8, 2010 and on December 22, 2010.
The appellant requests the following documents to be

included in the clerk's record in addition to those automatically
included under Rule 28, I.A.R.:

All filings in the matter.
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7.

The appellant requests the following documents, charts,

or pictures offered or admitted as exhibits to be copies and sent
to the Supreme Court:

8.

All.

I certify:
(a)

That a copy of this notice of appeal has been

served on the reporter of whom a transcript has been requested as
named below at the address set out below:
Name and address: Val Larson, 215 S. First Ave, Sandpoint,
Idaho 83864;
(b)

That the clerk of the district court has been paid

the estimated fee for preparation of the reporter's transcript in
the sum of $200.00;
(c)

That the clerk of the district court has been paid

the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record in the sum
of $100.00;
(d)

That the appellate filing fee has been paid in the

amount of $101.00.
(e)

That service has been made upon all parties

required to be served pursuant to Rule 20.
Dated this

~

of February, 2011.

..
~~

~

BN A. F I N N E Y ; - -

FINNEYF:NNEY & FINNEY, P. A.
Attorney for Appellant
RAYMOND SCOTT PECK

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3

098

,

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that true and correct copies of the
foregoing were served by U.S. mail, postage prepaid, this
day of February, 2011 and were addressed to:
Susan K. Servick
Special Deputy Attorney General
618 North 4~ Street
P.O. Box 2900
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816
Val Larson
215 S. First Ave
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 4

By:~. ~-

7*-

02/09/2011 WED 15:52 FAX 208 667 1825 Susan K. Servick
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'. ""'
JOHN A. FINNEY
FrNNEY FINNEY & FrNNEY, P.A.
Attorneys a.t Law
Old Power Souse Bui~dinq
120 East Lake Street, Suite 317
Sandpoint r.o 83864
Phone:
(208) 263-7712
Fax:
(208) 263-8211
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER
RAYMOND

SCOTT

PECK,

)
)

Petitioner,

Case No. CV-2010-0047

)
)

v.

)

STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,

)
)

)

STIPULATION TO STAY
SUSPENSION OF DRIVING
PRIVILEGES UPON FURTHER
APPEAL

)

Respondent.

)
)

COMES NON the Petitioner

RAXNOND

SCOTT PECK through counsel,

JOHN A. FINNEY, and the Respondent STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION, through counsel, SUSAN K. SERv:IClt, and stipul.ate
to stay the suspension of the Petitioner's driving privileges, set
out in the Notice of Suspension dated December 2, 2009 and served
on or about December 3, 2009, and the Notice Of Reactivated
Administrative License Suspension, dated January 10,2011, until
final resolution of this matter upon further appeal.
Dated this

day of

------- ,

2011.

£
L u I~flBii~.
SiJSAifK~JJnCC
A.m::t~.-::::'

Special. Deputy Attorney Genera1
Attorney for Respondent

~~rney

for Petitioner
'l-(lD (Ir
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~usan K.

Servick

CERTIFICATE OF

SER~CE

I hereby cert~~y that a true and correct copy of the
was served by deposit in First Class, U.S. Mail,
postage prepaid, this
let'day o~
RGhVV'?"1:=)< , 2011, and.
was addressed as follows:
~oregoing,

Susan K. Serv~ck
Special Deputy Attorney General
618 North 4th Street
P.O. Box 2900
Coeur d/~ene, rclaho 83816
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JOHN A. FINNEY
FINNEY FINNEY & FINNEY, P.A.
Attorneys at Law
Old Power House Building
120 East Lake Street, Suite 317
Sandpoint ID 83864
Phone:
(208) 263-7712
Fax:
(208) 263-8211
ISB No. 5413
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER
RAYMOND SCOTT PECK,

)
)

Petitioner,

)

v.

)
)

STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,

Case No. CV-2010-0047

)
ORDER STAYING SUSPENSION OF
DRIVING PRIVILEGES UPON
FURTHER APPEAL

)
)
)

Responden t .

)
)

The Stipulation To Stay Suspension Of Driving Privileges Upon
Further Appeal coming before the Court pursuant to I.A.R. 13, and
for good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1.

The suspension of RAYMOND SCOTT PECK's driving

privileges set out in the Notice of Suspension dated December 2,
2009 and served on or about December 3, 2009, and the Notice Of
Reactivated Administrative License Suspension, dated January 10,
2011 is stayed pending final resolution of this matter upon
further appeal.
2.

Pending further order of the Court, RAYMOND SCOTT
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PECK's Idaho Driver's License No. #QK306825A and driving
privileges are valid.
3.

The Idaho Transportation Department is Ordered to

return RAYMOND SCOTT PECK's drivers license to
4.

h~ ~ediately.

This Order shall operate as RAYMOND SCOTT PECK's

drivers license until receipt of his driver's license from the

Idaho Transportation
Dated this

Depar~

l~daY

of

~Oll.

m~J*
CERTIFICATE OF CLERK'S RULE 77(d) SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy, with the
clerk's filing stamp thereon showing the date of filing, of the
foregoing, was served by deposit in F~'r Class, U.S. Mail,
postage prepaid, this
1/
day of ~ , 2011, and
was addressed as follows':
John A. Finney
Finney Finney & Finney, P. A.,
Attorneys at Law
Old Power House Building
120 East Lake Street, Suite 317
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864

-AtLl1J..d-t/t/q-t!A.. J rfi
J I
I(

Susan K. Servick
Special Deputy Attorney General
618 North 4~ Street
P.O. Box 2900
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816
By:

Idaho Transportation Department
Administrative Hearing Section
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83707

Il

at 14k<

Clerk of Court
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TO:

Clerk of the Court
Bonner County Courthouse
215 South First Avenue
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864

CASE NO. CV 2010-47
DOCKET NO. 38542-2011
RAYMOND SCOTT PECK
vs
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION

NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPTS LODGED

Notice is hereby given that on April 12, 2011,

I lodged

the transcript from the Oral Argument proceedings held on
September 8, 2010 and the Motion to Reconsider proceedings held
on December 22, 2010 totaling 43 pages for the above-referenced
case with the District Court Clerk of the County of Bonner in
the First Judicial District.

k

~

~~~.Valerie
! ~~/)tJ'
~arson
April 12, 2011

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER
RAYMOND SCOTT PECK,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

)
)
)
)

)
Vs.

SUPREME COURT NO 38542-2011
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE
OF EXHIBITS

)
)

STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF )
TRANSPORT ATION,
)
)

Defendant-Appellant.

)
)

I, Marie Scott, Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of
Idaho, in and for the County of Bonner, do hereby certify that the following is offered as the
Clerk's exhibit on appeal:
Agency Record filed February 16, 2010
Copy of Transcript of the Administrative License Suspension Hearing for the Idaho
Department of Transportation In The Matter of Raymond Scott Peck held December
29,2009 Before Hearing Officer Eric Moody and filed March 1, 2010

IN WI~NESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said
Court this :2pr day of March, 2011.

Clerk's Certificate of Exhibits

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER

RAYMOND SCOTT PECK,

)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE

)
)

SUPREME COURT NO 38542-2011

vs.

)
)
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF )
TRANSPORT ATION,
)
)
Defendant-Respondent
)
)

I, Marie Scott, Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of
Idaho, in and for the County of Bonner, do certify that the foregoing Record in this cause was
compiled and bound under my direction and is a true, correct and complete Record of the
pleadings and documents requested by Appellant Rule 28.
IN WITN~SS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said
Court this 21 St- day of March, 2011.

Marie Scott
Clerk of the District Court

Clerk's Certificate

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER

RAYMOND SCOTT PECK,

)
SUPREME COURT NO 38542-2011

)

Plaintiff-Respondent,

)
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE
OF SERVICE

)
)

vs.

)
)

STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF )
TRANSPORTATION,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
)
I, Marie Scott, Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of
Idaho, in and for the County of Bonner, do hereby certify that I have personally served or
mailed, by United Parcel Service, one copy of the CLERK'S RECORD to each of the Attorneys
of Record in this cause as follows:
JOHN A. FINNEY
FINNEY, FINNEY, & FINNEY
120 LAKE ST., STE. 317
SANDPOINT, ID 83864

SUSAN K. SERVICK
SPECIAL DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
618 N. 4TH STREET
COEUR d' Alene, ID 83816

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said
day of March, 2011.
Court this
Marie Scott
Clerk of the District Court
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